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Executive summary
Topic and rationale 
In recent years, corruption in land governance has come 
under greater scrutiny, not least as a result of increased 
commercial value of agricultural and peri-urban land in 
developing countries and concerns that corruption may 
play a role in facilitating large-scale land acquisition by 
investors. Corruption is associated with unresponsive, 
unaccountable and frequently ineffective land governance, 
as recognised in the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(VGGT). However, there is very little systematic analysis 
of the relationship between drivers, actors and types of 
corruption in different aspects of land governance. 
This paper seeks to analyse causes, types and effects of 
corruption in land governance and provide evidence-based 
recommendations to address corruption, with a particular 
focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. The findings draw on a 
literature review of land governance and corruption within 
national land administration systems and in processes of 
land and agribusiness investment at the international and 
national levels, and on selected interviews with experts, 
activists and researchers of land governance. 
Political economy analysis of corruption in 
land governance
Corruption flags the abuse of power, be it a simple bribe, 
grand kickback schemes, systematic rent-seeking behaviour 
or complex political patronage and patron–client 
relationships. Our premise is that corruption affects the 
rules, processes and decisions framing land. The analytical 
framework draws on political economy analysis enabling a 
deeper understanding of power relations, in particular the 
distribution of power and wealth between actors and the 
underlying dynamics sustaining these relations. 
Corruption in land governance at a national level
International surveys such as the Global Corruption 
Barometer and the East African Bribery Index have 
shown that institutions responsible for land management 
are among the most corrupt, with only the police and 
the judiciary found to be more corrupt. Our findings 
corroborate that land governance at a national and local 
level is highly corruption-prone. Not only do ordinary land 
users face additional costs in bribes and informal payments 
in obtaining rights to land and access to land services, 
but also wider issues of political patronage and impunity 
throughout society compound land governance.
In particular, the following systemic enablers of 
corruption were identified: prevalence of discretionary 
power within land administration; the role of parallel 
institutions for land management, including overlapping 
formal and customary institutions and the partial or non-
recognition in law of established customary rights; and 
extensive state powers and non-transparent procedures for 
the allocation and privatisation of public land.
Corruption has been shown to be extensive in processes 
of delivery and development of urban land for commercial 
and residential purposes (illustrated in a variety of West 
African cities); in processes of land acquisition from and 
utilisation of land revenues by customary authorities 
(illustrated by the case of Ghana); and in the capture 
of land titling programmes by national and local elites 
(illustrated by the case of Kenya).  
The analysis of selected Land Governance Assessment 
Framework (LGAF) country reports confirms these findings 
on the prevalence of particular types and the governance 
contexts of corruption while also showing that patterns of 
corruption in the land sector are highly country-specific. 
The main actors in petty and administrative corruption in 
securing land access, land rights and outcomes of planning 
and land allocation decisions are public officials and in some 
cases customary leaders, often operating in collusion with 
land professionals, and commercial developers. Politicians 
and high-ranking public officials are key actors in cases 
of grand, systematic and political corruption. Although 
social values and ‘practical norms’ play a role in framing 
corruption, the prime incentive for corruption in land 
governance at a national level is profit and personal gain 
through the extraction of bribes and access to profits from 
land sales and development in administrative and petty 
corruption. An additional incentive is the use of land as 
an asset for patronage to consolidate political power and 
influence in cases of political corruption. 
Corruption in land governance at the 
transnational level
The paper explores different actors, incentives and types 
of corruption along the investment chain of agribusiness. 
Although allegations of corruption are extremely sensitive 
and hard to prove, the principal conclusion is that 
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corruption is most evident at the ‘midstream’ level of 
the investment chain, associated with deal-making in the 
formation of in-country partnerships, joint ventures, land 
acquisition and project planning and installation by local 
subsidiaries, concession holders and project managers. 
This is supported by investment finance originating higher 
up the chain, with weak governance in host countries as a 
prime enabler of corrupt practice. 
Of particular concern is the risk of corruption 
associated with larger-scale investments, agricultural 
development corridors and their supply chains, whereby 
investors including national and local elites can override 
the rights and interests of less powerful land users. Key 
corruption risks are impunity of political elites in securing 
favourable land allocations, leading to elite capture of 
international land deals, associated kickbacks and profits 
from commercial land development, and the use of land 
for political patronage at the midstream level. In addition, 
unclear legislative and regulatory frameworks around 
large-scale agricultural investment open up much room 
for discretion and abuse by public officials and powerful 
individuals at national and local levels. At an upstream level, 
the opaque structures of both national and international 
companies and lack of transparency surrounding financing 
and contractual details of investment projects constitute 
systemic corruption risks. Lack of transparency in 
investment chains and company ownership structures, and, 
at the midstream level, in land allocation for investment 
purposes also renders the systematic identification of 
involved actors and specific types of corruption problematic. 
Assessment of anti-corruption initiatives
A wide range of initiatives and reforms address corruption 
at all levels of land governance. Nationally, vested 
interests within land administration at all levels of the 
hierarchy make it difficult to reform systems from the 
inside. Anti-corruption measures are most effective when 
other contextual factors support them and when they are 
integrated into a broader package of institutional reforms, 
for instance public financial management reforms and 
changes to the incentive and reward structure in public 
service. The literature suggests pragmatic approaches 
work best that combine appropriate legislative reforms 
to ensure recognition of land rights through improved 
land information systems; simplified procedures that 
reduce discretionary powers and take advantage of new 
technologies; moratoria on land allocation processes shown 
to be corrupt; and targeted action against perpetrators. 
In relation to large-scale land acquisitions, the 
most important anti-corruption measures include, at a 
transnational level, both soft and hard law addressing acts 
of corruption committed by companies, such as the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-
Bribery Convention. At a national level, they include the 
establishment of anti-corruption institutions and legislative 
reforms. However, the implementation and enforcement 
of these initiatives lack teeth. In practice, they need to 
be combined with efforts to increase transparency in the 
planning of land investments and with focused efforts to 
improve land governance in regions and locations targeted for 
land investment and commercial agricultural development. 
The main causes of land-related corruption identified 
in the paper are lack of political will at a host country 
level, linked to vested interests in land development and 
control of land for the purposes of patronage, and the 
power imbalance between actors profiting from corruption 
and those suffering its effects. Introduction of systems for 
greater transparency and accountability from the outside 
in the absence of political will and acceptance is likely to 
be problematic. Effective anti-corruption reforms are thus 
likely to be dependent on political dynamics and may need 
to bide their time until appropriate political moments.
The principal implications of this assessment for action 
to curb corruption in land governance are:  
 • a need for joint and complementary action by stakeholders 
at national level and internationally to overcome 
corruption in land administration and land investment
 • a need to strengthen the management of both domestic 
and foreign land investment, supported by better, more 
transparent land information at the national level, and 
by international action
 • application by the existing global consensus on 
principles of good land governance and fit-for-purpose 
land administration systems, which include all legitimate 
rights, make information publically available and are 
accountable to their users, in ways that integrate anti-
corruption measures in order to mitigate the costs that 
routine imposes on citizens, in particular on the weak, 
the vulnerable and people in poverty
 • a need for closer attention to home country policies and 
donor programming in investor countries: to establish 
coherent, whole-of-government approaches to address 
corruption; and to ensure consistency and coordination 
in development assistance between the promotion of 
land-based investment in agriculture and other sectors, 
and effective support to land governance and land 
administration on the ground where investment occurs
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Main recommendations
The main recommendations for the principal 
stakeholder groups (national governments in developing 
and land investment host countries, the private sector, 
investor country governments, donor and multilateral 
agencies, and civil society) are set out below. 
National governments should:
 • Support and implement legal reforms to ensure 
recognition of multiple forms of tenure, including 
customary rights, to promote more inclusive 
formalisation of rights and delivery of land services and 
mitigate corruption in the allocation, conversion and 
development of customary land.
 • Prioritise and implement land administration reform, 
supported by analysis and mitigation of procedural 
weaknesses, corruption risks and vulnerability to elite 
capture.
 • Introduce preventive measures aiming to limit the 
discretionary powers of central and local government 
administrations with regard to land transfers 
and allocations, prioritising 1) completeness and 
transparency of the cadastre and 2) community 
participation and accountability.
 • Strengthen training in land administration on 
governance and transparency dimensions, with 
emphasis on public service, fairness and probity, 
including knowledge of national and international best 
practice (the VGGT and the Principles on Responsible 
Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems).
 • Introduce effective asset and income declaration systems 
for officials, including specification of the process for 
valuation and verification of landholdings by officials. 
 • Introduce public disclosure of governmental approval process 
for land-based investments and associated land transactions.
 • In addition, there are actions parliamentarians and 
civil society can take at country level to promote the 
application of these and other measures, as detailed in 
the final section of the main paper.  
The private sector should:
 • Implement best practice and comprehensive corporate 
anti-corruption policies at all operational levels 
throughout the investment chain. These should include 
clear follow-up mechanisms and be supported by 
process improvement initiatives to address corruption.
 • Ensure compliance with national and international 
anti-corruption legislation, including commitment to 
long-term institutional change in countries with weak 
governance, for instance by actively engaging with 
relevant ministries or chambers of commerce. 
 • Develop clear rules and standards of engagement at 
national and local level for large-scale international 
agricultural investment, guided by the VGGT and 
the Principles for Responsible Investment, where 
appropriate engaging with peers to develop international 
implementation guidelines; with host governments to 
develop clear standards of engagement informed by the 
VGGT; and with civil society and communities to develop 
clear standards, guided by free, prior and informed 
consent, to reduce the scope and risk of corruption.
 • Develop monitoring tools for corruption throughout an 
investment’s lifecycle.
 • Participate in voluntary reporting of land rights 
footprints and impacts of agri-investments and supply 
chains in conformity with UN Global Compact 
principles, utilising Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
reporting mechanisms and relevant GRI standards and 
indicators on land tenure currently under development.
 • Demonstrate clear leadership on zero tolerance of 
corruption and improve reporting on land corruption 
among associates, peers and supply chain actors, using 
mechanisms such as commodity roundtables and in-
country business associations.
In addition, there are various actions private sector 
stakeholders, including technology and land consultancy 
firms, geospatial data providers and the open data 
community more broadly, can take to support development 
and delivery of good systems of land administration that 
can help combat corruption.  
Investor country governments should:
 • Ensure the establishment of coherent and up-to-date 
whole-of-government approaches to addressing corruption, 
including land corruption in foreign jurisdictions. 
 • Strengthen and support the enforcement of the OECD 
Convention both in OECD countries, by implementing 
and enforcing anti-bribery legislation, and in non-
OECD countries, by continuing to support engagement 
with China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
 • Support legislative measures that address transnational 
corruption (e.g. UK Bribery Act, FCPA). 
 • Support strong anti-money laundering laws in the 
financial centres, such as the US Bank Secrecy Act and 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidelines, 
which call for enhanced monitoring by the global 
financial system when conducting business with 
politically exposed persons. 
 • Continue to promote and build coalitions to implement 
the VGGT and the Principles for Responsible Investment.
 • Introduce government requirements for disclosure of 
large-scale agricultural investments originating in investor 
countries and promoted by official aid, guided by the 
VGGT and the Principles for Responsible Investment.
 • Condition financial participation in large-scale 
agricultural investments on implementation of anti-
corruption measures, including financial reporting.
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Donors and multilateral agencies should: 
 • Provide technical and financial support to partner 
countries to strengthen land governance through legal 
reforms to ensure recognition of multiple forms of 
tenure, to promote more inclusive formalisation of 
rights and delivery of land services and to support 
reforms to land administration.
 • Introduce mandatory corruption risk assessments and 
mitigation measures that are sensitive to elite capture for 
all land administration and titling support programmes.
 • Introduce land governance support and related 
anti-corruption measures into areas prioritised for 
agricultural development and land investment, and link 
land governance support directly to other projects that 
tend to promote corruption in land administration to 
mitigate negative impacts. 
 • Develop appropriate methodologies for corruption risk 
assessment and identification of mitigating measures 
and make this assessment mandatory for all land 
administration or land titling and registration support 
programmes, and for all development programmes that 
involve the acquisition of land (e.g. for infrastructure 
development or investment purposes).
 • Exercise caution in programming any support for 
agricultural and infrastructure investment or for land 
titling and registration programmes in weak and 
corruption-prone land governance environments.
 • Support the Global Donor Working Group on Land 
to engage with home governments on full VGGT 
application, including extraterritorial investments, 
supported by engagement on international rules, open 
contracts and policy coherence, striving for whole-of-
government approaches at home and abroad.
 • Prioritise renewing efforts around land transparency by 
linking a G7 and corporate land transparency and reporting 
initiative to existing corporate reporting mechanisms, for 
example through extension of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative to land, and by utilising GRI 
sustainability reporting, which is due to incorporate land.
 • Support further research on relationships between 
corruption in land, investment, economic growth and 
development, and the development of methodologies for 
data generation and country-level context-specific and 
comparative analysis of land governance and corruption, 
such as the LGAF scorecards and country reports, for 
application in the LGAF and other analytical tools.
 • Use the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Goal 
16, as a frame of reference to mainstream anti-corruption 
programming in land governance, and operationalise them 
in conjunction with sector-specific frameworks such as the 
VGGT and the Principles for Responsible Investment.
Civil society organisations should:
 • Conduct systematic training and advocacy for citizens, 
local non-governmental organisations and grassroots 
organisations on how to activate pressure points, in 
particular on existing legal framework; on the scope 
and content of and stakeholders in international best 
practices, in particular the VGGT; and on commitments 
of the government at national and international level to 
achieve greater transparency and accountability. 
 • Run public awareness campaigns on how to identify potential 
corruption, conflicts of interest and vehicles for reporting.
 • Set up and run own reporting hotlines, guided by the Do 
No Harm principle, to increase transparency on corrupt 
practices in land administration. 
 • Collaborate regionally and internationally to foster 
knowledge exchange on international best practice on 
land governance and anti-corruption, and lobby for and 
monitor implementation of the VGGT. 
 • Sensitise citizens in the North and South on the 
causes and effects of corruption in land governance, 
in particular in large-scale agricultural investments, 
and support constructive processes of addressing these 
problems, using the VGGT and the Principles for 
Responsible Investment as a frame of reference. 
 • Support and engage in multi-stakeholder processes 
between the private sector, the public sector (in the North 
and South) and civil society to support transparency in 
transnational large-scale agricultural investment projects.
 • Support international media coverage of corrupt deals to 
foster national and international accountability processes. 
 • Sensitise governments and citizens in the North and 
South on the linkages of addressing corruption in land 
governance with the Sustainable Development Goals, in 
particular Goal 16 and its sub-goals. 
Media, technology and mapping initiatives across sectors 
The digital open-data community as a whole, including 
for-profit developers and technology firms, non-profit 
social enterprise and civil society organisations and private 
and public investors and funding organisations, can also 
take specific anti-corruption actions.   
 • Foster enhanced use of media, social media and Open 
Source Intelligence Tools to support the distribution and 
gathering of information about land deals and increasing 
public involvement at all stages of the transactions. 
 • Support mapping initiatives such as Google Earth, the 
Land Matrix and others that can harvest corruption-
sensitive data on land deals to be made public and to 
input into systems and applications. 
 • Support innovative uses of technology like mobile 
money that can bypass lower-level officials, reducing 
opportunity for bribery. Other processes, such as 
application for and issuance of land documents or 
putting property records online, may be automated 
using online/mobile hardware and software. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Topic and rationale
In recent years, corruption in land governance has come 
under greater scrutiny, not least as a result of the increased 
commercial value of agricultural and peri-urban land 
in developing countries. Corruption is associated with 
unresponsive, unaccountable and frequently ineffective 
land governance1, affecting control over land and access 
to the sector’s institutions. As the latest Global Corruption 
Barometer states: 
‘Around the world, one in five people report that they 
had paid a bribe for land services. The high percentage 
of bribery in the land sector creates a substantial 
informal cost for those trying to register or transfer 
land. It can make land services inaccessible to people 
not able to afford these illegal payments. By creating 
a disincentive to register property transactions, the 
informality of land tenure increases, people are left 
with little or no protection under the law, making them 
vulnerable to evictions and other abuses’ (TI, 2013: 11). 
In Africa, this percentage is even higher: every second 
person has paid a bribe to secure or access land administration 
services, with land services the third most corrupt sector after 
the police and the judiciary (TI Kenya, 2015, Annex 1). 
These are worrying findings, especially as land is a key 
asset for which the state controls the means of allocating 
and distributing rights. The rise in large-scale agricultural 
investments in developing countries and criticisms of ‘land-
grabbing’ – that is, allegations of human rights abuses and 
illicit enrichment around large-scale land acquisitions – are 
added sources of concern with regard to drivers, patterns 
and types of corruption in land governance. 
The importance of improved land governance is 
increasingly been recognised on an international level. The 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security (FAO and CFS, 2012), referred 
to here as VGGT, constitute the most important global 
guiding framework on land governance. The VGGT are 
a set of internationally negotiated soft law principles on 
the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests, 
which UN member states have adopted through the UN 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS). They emphasise 
the importance of clearly publicised land policies and 
transparency in land information to help prevent illegality 
and corruption in land markets and the administration of 
land taxes. They also uphold internationally recognised 
principles of consultation with land users, including 
holders of customary rights and indigenous people, in cases 
of lands development, investment and private allocation of 
public lands.2
1 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines land governance as ‘the rules, processes and structures through which decisions are made about access 
to land and its use, the manner in which the decisions are implemented and enforced, the way that competing interests in land are managed’ (Palmer, 2009: 9). 
A further definition, highlighting the significance of power relations, speaks of land governance as ‘processes, institutions, laws, practices and structures of 
power involving a diverse range of public and private actors’ (Hirsch and Scurrah, 2015: 1). The World Bank defines governance as ‘the manner in which 
public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services’ (p.67).
2 See FAO and CFS (2012). For the connection between land rights and the SDGs, see http://unsdsn.org/news/2015/09/22/measuring-land-rights-for-a-sustainable-future/ 
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Box 1: Corruption and the guiding principles of 
responsible tenure governance
The VGGT emphasise throughout the importance of 
related principles such as rule of law, transparency 
and accountability for responsible tenure. However, 
corruption is addressed explicitly only once. Under 
General Principles (§3A), §3.1.5 recognises that 
states should ‘[p]revent tenure disputes, violent 
conflicts and corruption. They should take active 
measures to prevent tenure disputes from arising and 
from escalating into violent conflicts. They should 
endeavour to prevent corruption in all forms, at all 
levels, and in all settings’ (FAO and CFS, 2012: 4).
The 2015 G7 summit leaders’ declaration reaffirmed 
commitments to responsible agricultural investments 
aligned with the VGGT and the CFS Principles on 
Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems 
(CFS RAI) (see Box 10 in Section 5.3.1), including 
their statements on the importance of transparency and 
accountability and the avoidance of corruption. They also 
committed to improving monitoring and accountability 
both at country level and in relation to G7 nations’ 
own performance and supported investments.3 The UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) has 
focused historically on the importance of secure land 
and property rights in poverty reduction. More recently, 
DFID has considered the scope for a Land Transparency 
Initiative (LTI) along the lines of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the 2013 G8 summit 
resolved to support greater transparency in land 
transactions (G8 Communiqué, 2013: para 44).4 
1.2. Focus, methods and limitations 
This paper seeks to analyse causes, types and effects of 
corruption in land governance, and to provide evidence-
based recommendations to address corruption in land 
governance. For analytical clarity and more targeted 
recommendations, it will distinguish between corruption in 
national land governance on the one hand and corruption 
risks in large-scale agricultural investments on the other. 
Where the findings support it, we profile the inter-linkages 
between the two dimensions. 
The methods the analysis builds on are, first, a literature 
review of land governance and agribusiness and, second, 
assessments of relevant anti-corruption frameworks, which 
are, third, supported by interviews and conversations with 
experts.5 Although corruption is assumed to be a core 
feature of weak land governance and ‘land grabs’, there 
is very little literature systematically analysing corruption 
in land governance. Without the possibility of collecting 
primary data, the findings are heavily reliant on existing 
data and analyses on land governance or corruption in 
general. To mitigate the potential bias this may entail, we 
have triangulated data sources as far as possible by drawing 
on scholarly articles, reports by international organisations 
and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and indices, scorecards and qualitative country reports, as 
well as interviews with experts.
A further limitation relates to the geographical focus. 
This paper focuses mainly on African countries to allow 
for a deeper, rather than broader, analysis of corruption in 
land governance, while making reference to relevant cases 
and experience elsewhere. The selection is based on the 
expertise of the authors, which lies principally in Eastern, 
Western and Southern Africa. In addition, the in-depth, 
contextual analysis of specific issues allows for richer 
assessments and targeted recommendations. However, this 
does not imply corruption is more significant in Africa’s 
land governance than in other regions or countries. 
1.3. Structure of the paper
The paper is structured in following way: 
 • Section 2 sets out the conceptual framework and 
methodology. It also provides key definitions of 
corruption and links them to key literature on 
corruption in land governance. 
 • Section 3 focuses on the national level, analysing 
patterns and risks of corruption in national land 
governance and administration. 
 • Section 4 explores patterns and risks of corruption in 
large-scale agricultural investments. 
 • Section 5 assesses established anti-corruption initiatives 
and land governance reforms as well as lessons learned 
in relation to the findings of Sections 2–4. 
 • Section 6 details policy recommendations and action 
points for specific actors (home country governments, 
host country governments, civil society, business, donors 
and multilateral agencies).
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3 Annex to the Leaders Declaration, G7 Summit, Schloss Elmau, Germany, 7–8 June 2015. The declaration also stated that the G7 would strive to promote the 
conformance of private investments under the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition with the Voluntary Guidelines and CFS RAI, and that ‘the responsible 
governance of tenure of land is crucial for socially equitable agricultural development and for attracting investment. We will therefore continue our support of partner 
countries in their implementation of the VGGT, continue with the existing G7 Land Partnerships and seek to add new ones where appropriate.’
4 In 2015, DFID adopted a strategic objective to ‘support peace and security, drive out corruption, and support open societies and transparent and 
accountable institutions’, which involves promotion of better functioning, more transparent and accountable land administration and investment support 
services in addition to ensuring support to commercial agriculture and mobilisation of private finance for the purpose is linked to adequate safeguards of 
land rights and the creation of new opportunities for rural populations (guidance notes for DFID 2015 Bilateral Aid Review).
5 This included discussions with Transparency International (TI), DAI, members of the Land: Enhancing Governance for Economic Developmen 
(LEGEND) Core Land Support Team (CLST), Dr Alain Durrand Lasserve of the French land tenure committee, Global Witness, the International 
Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) and participants in the recent Tainted Lands assessment of corruption in large-scale land acquisition.
2. Definitions and 
conceptual framework
2.1. Defining corruption
Corruption is understood broadly as the ‘use of entrusted 
power for private gain’.6 Corruption flags the abuse of 
power, be it a simple bribe, grand kick-back schemes, 
systematic rent-seeking behaviour or complex political 
patronage and patron–client relationships. Conventionally, 
‘petty’ corruption – that is, low, often routine, payments to 
low-ranking officials (e.g. small bribes to the traffic police) 
– is distinguished from ‘grand’ corruption, describing 
large financial and economic opportunities higher up 
the political echelon (such as kick-backs in large public 
procurement contracts). Administrative corruption is 
frequently on the petty side, involving ‘speed money’ or 
‘facilitation payments’ for official transactions such as 
licensing, permits or registration. 
Political corruption means beneficiaries are in a position 
to make or influence government decisions. Frequently, this 
involves senior officials, ministers or even heads of state. 
However, and especially with the spread of devolution 
and decentralisation, it can also involve senior officials in 
local governments.7 Sometimes, this type of corruption 
by political and economic elites is called elite capture. 
State capture is a specific form of political corruption, 
defined as the efforts of firms to shape the laws, policies 
and regulations of the state to their own advantage by 
providing illicit private gains to public officials (Hellman 
and Kaufmann, 2001). Rent-seeking is a particular form 
of corruption, representing incomes that are above normal 
that would otherwise have been earned, thus creating 
incentives to create and maintain these rents. These 
activities can range from bribery and coercion to perfectly 
legal activities such as lobbying (see Khan, 2000).
These distinctions are helpful to break down particular 
levels, types and actors of corruption and possibly their 
incentive structure. However, in many cases, it is very 
difficult to neatly separate different forms and causes 
of corruption. For example, political corruption may 
undermine the justice system and thus lead to greater 
administrative corruption (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Rose-Ackermann, 1999; Robinson, 1998). Other 
examples linking political and grand corruption to petty 
corruption include cases where a percentage of the petty 
corruption percolates up the system to aliment senior 
positions or political parties (Moody-Stuart, 1998). These 
interrelationships require analytical attention.
2.2. Background literature on the 
relationship between corruption and land 
governance
Surprisingly, there is very little literature explicitly 
addressing corruption in land governance. One of the few 
systematic overviews of corruption in land governance can 
be found in a Working Paper published by Transparency 
International (TI) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) in 2011. This demonstrates not only 
that corruption tends to be higher in low-income countries 
but also that people with lower incomes suffer more and 
thus disproportionately from corruption, arguing corruption 
in land governance is a serious developmental impediment. 
Key correlations between corruption, governance, land 
and development are tested with data from the Corruption 
Perceptions Index and the Global Corruption Barometer. 
The statistically significant results include:
 • a strong positive correlation between petty and grand 
corruption in land
6 This is currently the most widely used definition of corruption, coined by TI (see http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/). Recognising changing 
patterns of authority and power, it consciously incorporates not just corrupt practices of officials in the public sector but also those in international NGOs 
and the private sector. 
7 For a discussion of definitions of corruption see Johnston (1996), Menocal Rocha and Taxell (2015) or Robinson (1998). 
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8 However, according to the Working Paper, the last three correlations work mainly through the income variable (see TI and FAO, 2011, Annex, p.5). 
9 Based on the Tirana Declaration, large-scale commercial land investments qualify as land grabs if they involve violation of human rights; are not based 
on free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of the affected land users; are not based on a through assessment; are in disregard of social, economic and 
environmental impacts; are not based on transparent and comprehensive contracts; and/or are not based on effective, planning, independent oversight and 
meaningful participation (Global Witness, 2012: 10; see also http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/tiranadeclaration.pdf)
10 See also the definitions of land governance in footnote 1, above. 
11 See, for instance, Bayart et al. (2009), Chabal (2009), Chabal and Daloz (1999), Jain (2001 a and b), Koechlin (2013), Mamdani (1996) or Rose-
Ackermann (1978, 1999). See also Section 3. 
 • a very strong positive correlation between corruption in land 
and overall perceptions of corruption in the public sector
 • a strong negative correlation between corruption in land 
and income per capita
 • a negative correlation between corruption in land and 
human development for both petty and grand corruption
 • a negative correlation between corruption in land and 
crop yield of cereals 
 • a strong negative correlation between corruption in land 
and foreign direct investment (FDI), for both petty and 
grand corruption.8 
A further argument emerging from the literature 
regards the state’s dominant role in land management 
and allocation, which facilitates elite capture and ‘land 
grabbing’,9 especially in contexts where property rights 
are weak. A recent study on three African countries argues 
that, ‘growing pressures on land for investment and 
patronage purposes have created incentives for political 
corruption, posing a challenge to safeguarding tenure and 
livelihoods of local communities’ (Owen et al., 2015: 1). 
Powerful individuals, groups and companies manipulate 
state power and authority, employing strategies ranging 
from petty to grand corruption to secure their control 
over profitable investments in land (Boone, 2009; Global 
Witness, 2012; MacInnes, 2015; Owen et al., 2015). 
In sum, the evidence from the key literature points first 
to the negative impact corruption in land governance has 
on overall development. Second, it outlines the significance 
of power relations shaping the dynamics of corruption 
in land governance. To understand why and in what 
way corruption affects developmental outcomes, a more 
fine-grained understanding of power relations is needed. 
The following section outlines an analytical approach that 
captures the dimension and levels of power and politics in 
land governance. 
2.3. Conceptual framework: A political 
economy analysis 
This paper understands land governance as shaping and 
being shaped by power relations that underpin institutions 
and relationships between actors. The conceptual 
framework of draws on a political economy analysis. 
A succinct definition is provided by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): 
‘Political economy analysis is concerned with the 
interaction of political and economic processes in a 
society: the distribution of power and wealth between 
different groups and individuals, and the processes that 
create, sustain and transform these relationships over 
time’ (quoted in DFID, 2009: 1). Drawing on political 
economy analysis, power relations and the distribution of 
wealth between actors can be understood as key factors in 
determining dynamics and outcomes of land governance 
processes (DFID, 2009; Hudson and Leftwich, 2014).10 
The relevance of political economy analysis is also 
borne out by the focus on corruption in land governance. 
As our introductory remarks indicated, this report is based 
on the hypothesis that a ‘variety of economic, political, 
administrative, social and cultural factors enable and foster 
corruption’ (Menocal Rocha and Taxell, 2015: 14). In turn, 
corruption is embedded in political and social relations 
informing formal institutions and procedures.11 Corruption 
thus constitutes a significant factor shaping the dynamics 
of land governance. 
For the purposes of this paper, this translates into 
a multidimensional political economy analysis that is 
concerned with four dimensions: 
1. the actors involved in or affected by corruption and land 
governance, and the interests and incentives that inform 
their agency. 
2. the role formal institutions (e.g. laws, ministries, etc.) 
and informal social, political and cultural norms play 
in shaping social interaction and political and economic 
competition
Box 2: The unclear role of income on levels and 
correlations of corruption
TI and FAO (2011) conclude there ‘are clear, strong, 
and negative relationships between perceived higher 
levels of corruption in land and lower growth, 
investment, development and agricultural output. 
However, the strong force exerted by income 
in these equations suggest that further analysis 
would be useful to better understand the nature of 
these relationships and additional factors (such as 
3. the impact of values, ideas and socio-cultural practices 
on actors and institutions, including political ideologies, 
religion or tradition 
4. the role of assets that actors use and accumulate in 
furthering their interests and underpinning their agency, 
ranging from economic assets to social and political 
capital (DFID, 2009; Harris, 2013; Hudson and 
Leftwich, 2014).
This approach seeks to capture the intersecting and 
competing interests and behaviour of multiple actors 
in the state, civil society and the private sector that 
shape and determine the institutional arrangements for 
land governance, and the causes, patterns and effects 
of corruption. Although the four analytical dimensions 
are interdependent, their disaggregation opens up 
explanatory spaces. Institutions provide constraints but 
also opportunities in determining rules of land access 
and management and in structuring distribution of land; 
actors make decisions within this institutional landscape, 
their decisions in turn shaped by their interests, incentives 
and networks they can draw on and the deployment of 
assets such as financial resources, information and social 
and political connections among competing actors in 
negotiating access to land and secure rights. Lastly, values, 
norms and practices are key to understanding affective, 
habitual and cultural dimensions that economic or political 
factors do not capture.
In practice, it is very challenging to separate the 
interdependencies between these dimensions neatly. 
However, Figure 1 depicts the different levels and 
dimensions pertinent to a political economy analysis of 
corruption in land governance. It is important to bear in 
mind that these are ideal-typical distinctions that serve to 
reduce complexity by focusing the analytical lens on key 
levels and dimensions of land governance. 
The four dimensions illustrated here represent the 
different levels at which land governance takes place. 
As a result of globalisation, these levels are increasingly 
permeable and interconnected, but their analytical 
distinction remains important to identify specific actors, 
institutions, assets and norms shaping corruption: 
 • The transnational level encompasses actors, dynamics 
and institutional frameworks that transcend national 
boundaries, for example multinational companies. For 
the purposes of this paper, it includes the international 
level – that is, actors, norms and institutions of more 
than one nation, such as multilateral organisations. 
These are discussed in Section 4, on international 
agribusiness investments. 
 • The country level captures the broader political 
economy environment on a national level, including 
the legislative and regulatory framework and political 
regimes. This is explored in Section 3, on corruption in 
national land administration and governance, and in 
Section 4, in considering ‘midstream’-level corruption in 
land investment chains.  
 • The sectoral level focuses on specific institutions and 
actors in land governance and their interrelationships. 
These are addressed in Section 3, on corruption in land 
administration systems 
 • Lastly, a political economy analysis opens up the 
possibility of closing in on a particular problem. 
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Figure 1: Levels and dimensions of political economy analysis
Source: Authors, drawing on DFID (2009: 8) and Hudson and Leftwich (2014: Chapter 7).
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This problem-driven approach brings a specific issue 
into sharper relief within specific levels or, where 
appropriate, across all levels (DFID, 2009; Harris, 
2013), for example the specific forms of corruption 
prevalent in land governance and land investment, 
discussed in Sections 3 and 4. 
For the purposes of this paper, Figure 1 is used as a 
heuristic tool for contextual understanding of the enablers 
and dynamics of corruption in land governance and 
agribusiness investments, to guide and focus the literature 
review of corruption rather than providing a rigorous 
analytical framework. Given the limited space of the report 
on the one hand and its broad scope on the other, this 
heuristic analysis allows for a more contextual analysis of 
corruption in land governance.
3. Corruption in national 
land governance and 
administration systems 
3.1. The literature on corruption in land 
administration
Although a number of empirically informed studies are 
now available of good practice in land administration (e.g. 
Enemark et al., 2014; Williamson et al., 2010), very little 
analysis is available of the nature, scale, drivers and effects 
of corrupt land administration practice. A number of case 
studies of poor land governance in which corrupt practices 
play a role do, however, provide some insights into the 
specific features of land administration and governance 
systems and related patterns and drivers of corruption.
One of the most common forms in which corruption 
occurs is in bribery of land officials to facilitate access 
to information and services or favourable outcomes of 
administrative decisions in land valuation, development 
planning, resolution of disputes or formal allocation of 
land rights (Owen et al., 2015; TI and FAO, 2011). This 
occurs as a result of the high level of discretionary power 
and authority and access to rent-seeking opportunities that 
land officials have as a result of the complexity and lack of 
clarity of land administration procedures. These are often 
ill suited to the needs of most land users in developing 
countries, and frequently entail the abuse of discretion for 
personal gain, combined with nepotism or favouritism, 
involving family members or political or business 
associates. Systems to detect bribery and corruption within 
land registration and valuation offices are largely inexistent 
(van der Molen and Tuladhar, 2007). 
In addition to the acceptance of bribes, corruption can 
take the form of fraud and alteration of land records and 
forgery of land documents, multiple allocations of the 
same plots of land and gaining kickbacks from business 
relationships or other benefits from parties with interests in 
acquiring, disposing of and developing land with whom land 
officials collude (Kakai, 2012; Obala and Mattingley, 2014).
Studies from West Africa (Durand Lasserve, 2015; 
Durand Lasserve et al., 2015) show corrupt practice 
is increasingly frequent in processes of urban land 
development, owing to scarcity of land, rising demand 
and land values and the range of different actors and 
authorities engaged in land development and delivery 
processes. Urban land administration and development 
involve parallel and intersecting institutions and processes 
for accessing and securing rights to land, including both 
customary and a variety of formal authorities, such 
as land registries and survey, valuation and planning 
departments. All of these may be required to approve land 
transfers and development plans at different stages. The 
resulting complexity of administrative procedures confers 
considerable discretion on officials, who are able to exert 
control over land allocations and development schemes. 
Significant opportunities for profit exist for public officials 
in exploiting the price margin between unregistered 
customary or public land and formally registered urban 
plots with planning approvals and building permits. 
In addition to gaining from bribes to secure 
administrative transactions, officials may also collaborate 
and collude with developers, surveyors, planners and 
lawyers. These problems are particularly acute in 
circumstances of rapid urban development in which 
demand for residential and commercial land exceeds 
supply, leading to greater competition, rising land values 
and increased incentives for corrupt practice in the 
conversion and delivery of customary and public land for 
development. As land is converted for formally registered 
residential or commercial uses, those who lose out, in terms 
of additional costs and loss of land rights, are ordinary 
land applicants and land users and often the original 
owners or occupants of the land, (UN-Habitat, 2014). 
Poor land claimants and urban migrants are generally 
priced out of the resulting formal land markets, leading 
to reliance on informal rental markets and the expansion 
and increasing density of informal settlements. Although 
recognised in recent land literature, problems of corruption 
in urban land delivery and development have received 
little attention in the established literature on urbanisation, 
urban planning and land use management.
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In many African contexts, these issues are exacerbated 
by the non-recognition or partial and incomplete 
incorporation of customary rights to land by formal land 
governance systems. This enables state officials to bypass 
or ignore the rights of established customary landowners 
and users in deciding how to develop or allocate land 
(Peters, 2009). As identified by TI (Owen et al., 2015; TI 
and FAO, 2011) and various Land Governance Assessment 
Framework (LGAF) country reports (see Section 3.2), the 
nature of the tenure regime is a principal enabling factor 
promoting corruption.
In Africa, the colonial state granted chiefs powers 
over land as part of strategies to maintain indirect rule, 
which some cases has overridden established customary 
practices in which land was managed primarily by 
lineage and family heads. Under population and 
economic pressure, chiefs have become vulnerable to 
bribery and manipulation, able to use their authority 
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12 All references are to full country reports. All reports can be found online under http://go.worldbank.org/25DH0FX6M0 (last accessed 2 February 2016). 
Box 3: Chiefs and corruption in Ghana 
Ghana’s constitution vests all customary lands, 80% of the national land area in the respective customary owners, 
variously ‘stools’ or ‘skins’ – the institutions of chieftaincy in forest and semi-arid areas, respectively – and 
landholding family lineages. However land transactions have become increasingly monetised as a result of growing 
scarcity and increasing values, and the equity of customary tenure systems is now highly questionable, as control 
over economic benefits is increasingly concentrated in the hands of chiefs (Ubink, 2008; Ubink and Quan, 2008). 
Research has demonstrated that chiefs have rapidly converted farmland over which indigenous community 
members have usufructuary customary rights into residential land, allocated to outsiders through customary leases, 
leading to loss of land rights, displacement and increased costs for ordinary land users (Ubink, 2008). The processes 
whereby land is allocated are generally not transparent or documented in any way, and land allocations may be made 
without consultation of the original occupants or landholding families. In many cases, a customary tribute known 
as the institution of ‘drinks money’, originally used for purchase of alcohol for pouring libations to the gods, has 
become subject to manipulation and inflation to the level of a market price for purchase of a land lease (Kassanga 
and Kotey, 2001).
For commercial or residential development of land so acquired, leases must be registered with the land 
commission, whose concurrence with the customary transaction must be obtained together with necessary planning, 
subdivision and building permits. Land users and developers face similar hurdles and costs as a result of corruption 
(Antwi and Adams, 2003) as described for other West African countries by Durand Lasserve (2015) and others. 
Rentals subsequently become payable, collected by the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) a specialist 
agency created for distribution of land, forest and mineral revenues derived from customary land among traditional 
authorities and the relevant local government authorities and OASL itself. There is no transparency in this process, 
accounts are not published and, although land revenues are intended for investment by chiefs and local authorities 
for public and community purposes, the use of sums received lacks mechanisms for accountability. Money often 
fails to percolate downwards from the paramount chieftaincy that receives it from OASL. Unlike land rentals, drinks 
money is not subject to any form of scrutiny or control by OASL or any other authority (Ubink and Quan, 2008). 
There have been numerous cases of multiple sales of the same plots of land, either by the same chief or by different 
chiefs competing for control of the area in question, leading to multiple, unresolved, land disputes and imposing a 
brake on economic, business and residential development and creating a major backlog in the courts.
This setting also has repercussions for large-scale agricultural investment: ‘There is need for comprehensive 
and clear guidelines and standards for investors to follow in large-scale land acquisitions as often land deals with 
transnationals are conducted with chiefs as representatives of their communities but who only seek personal 
gains in the process of deals negotiation. This often leads to displacement of families from their lands and thereby 
sources of livelihoods’ (LGAF country report Ghana, 2013: 30).12 In other words, chiefs have acquired direct 
interests in land development schemes. Rising interest in agribusiness investment has reportedly fed the growth of 
corrupt practice among chiefs in rural areas and competition among different chiefs, layers of customary authority 
and family heads for control of the sums paid by investors for the right to develop land concessions (Amanor, 
personal communication, 2015), in addition to the commodification of smallholder rights in land (Amanor, 2010). 
Attempts to regularise the allocation and management of customary land have been made through the 
introduction of customary land secretariats (CLS) in Ghana, to compile inventories of existing customary rights and 
transfers, standardise leasehold agreements and facilitate the formal registration of leases by the Lands Commission 
and collection of rents by OASL. The mandate of these hybrid quasi-formal bodies does not extend to receipt of 
or accounting for drinks money paid to traditional chiefs, and the CLS programme has lacked sustained political, 
financial and technical support as a key component of Ghana’s land administration system (see Quan et al., 2008).
to demand payment or allocate land for commercial 
development schemes from which they can also benefit. 
Bouju (2009) observes in relation to Burkina Faso and 
Mali that the commodification of customary land can 
be seen as a form of corruption because there is a social 
transaction illegitimate in customary terms, whereby 
representatives of the customary community negotiate 
their exclusive land management customary prerogatives 
against personal economic benefits. These practices have 
become established in urban areas, with high demand for 
residential and commercial land, but also occur in rural 
areas, particularly those subject to small- or large-scale 
agribusiness investment and the allocation of natural 
resource concessions, where the chiefs must be consulted. 
In Ghana, as a result of post-colonial settlements, chiefs’ 
powers over land have become particularly entrenched 
and susceptible to abuse (see Box 3). 
The prerogatives of the state, encapsulated in 
the notion of ‘eminent domain’, are a fundamental 
constitutional tenet in many jurisdictions. In this, 
ultimate powers over land, independently of its tenure 
or ownership status, are vested in the state or in 
the president, often reinforced by specific powers of 
compulsory purchase in the public interest – but in 
practice frequently applied to enable private gain. The 
use of powers of eminent domain may relate directly to 
declared public purpose, for example the provision of 
essential infrastructure. However, unless its appropriate 
use is clearly and narrowly defined in national law, 
eminent domain may be widely invoked to justify 
discretionary actions by officials in land allocation, 
transfers and planning. Such discretionary official powers 
over land are most widely exercised where the state 
itself acts as a landowner and maintains large stocks 
of public land. Corruption in the disposal of public 
land can become systematic as a result of deliberate 
policies to promote its private allocation for purposes 
of commercial, industrial or agricultural development, 
or to implement large-scale land titling programmes, 
involving collusion between land administrators, land 
applicants, (frequently local elites and business people), 
and a range of intermediaries in the development process 
(Boone, 2014; Brown, 2005; Lund and Boone, 2013). 
Corrupt practices have become prevalent where new 
powers are granted to local government to promote 
urban development or land titling, even where central 
government seeks to maintain the public interest.  
The role of land as a means of patronage in the 
consolidation of political power can foster situations in 
which land titling and administration systems become 
captured by chains of corruption (Kakai, 2012) developing 
among elite business and official networks, encouraged 
from the top down, as illustrated by the case of Kenya 
(see Box 4). Although Kenya has now established a 
new constitutional settlement for land and embarked 
on remodelling land legislation and institutions to curb 
corruption, the problems are deeply rooted in the national 
political economy. This case indicates how powerful groups 
can instrumentalise institutions intended to strengthen 
property rights and economic development, ultimately 
leading to disempowerment of ordinary people, the 
undermining of markets and heightened political tensions 
(Kimeu et al., 2015; Manji, 2011, 2015; Onoma, 2011; 
Southall, 2005).
3.2. Corruption and the Land Governance 
Assessment Framework 
A key problem for the evidence-based assessment of 
corruption in land governance is that hardly any primary 
data are available for a systematic, comparative analysis 
of corruption in land governance. The most important 
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Box 4: Illegal public land allocation in Kenya
In Kenya, most corruption and fraudulent practices occurred in the processes for allocation of public land, 
triggering ethnic and political conflict. The estimate was that some 200,000 illegal titles were created between 
1962 and 2002 – close to 98% of these between 1986 and 2002. All categories of public land and trust land, were 
affected, the latter held by local councils on behalf of communities occupying and using them customarily. Illegal 
allocations were done on the orders of the president, other senior public officials and well-connected politicians 
or businessmen; despite the involvement of extensive networks, it is clear the problems started at the top 
(Government of Kenya, 2004; Southall, 2005). Prior to constitutional changes in 2010, authority was centralised 
in the land commissioner, a direct appointee of the president, often used to sanction highly irregular dispositions 
of land (Government of Kenya, 2004; Kimeu et al., 2015). Beneficiaries of grabbed land included ministers, 
senior civil servants, politicians, politically connected businessmen and even churches and mosques, plus local 
government officials and councillors (Government of Kenya, 2004).
Illegal transactions were hugely facilitated by the extensive complicity of professionals – lawyers, surveyors, 
valuers, physical planners, engineers, architects, land registrars, estate agents and bankers, all of whom 
also benefited (Southall, 2005). On acquiring titles, most grabbers would very quickly sell the land to state 
corporations at hugely inflated values. State corporations that lost their land to grabbers for free were then 
pressured to buy other lands at inflated prices. 
methodology for assessing land governance within and 
across countries is that developed by the World Bank. 
This provides a comprehensive diagnostic tool that 
covers five main areas for policy intervention: Legal and 
institutional framework; Land use planning, management 
and taxation; Management of public land; Public 
provision of land information; and Dispute resolution 
and conflict management. However, there are some 
methodological caveats. Although the LGAF panels, 
indicators and scorecards are common across countries, 
they rely heavily on information and opinions provided by 
experts, which invariably contain a degree of subjectivity 
in the frequency as well as the terminology with which 
corruption is identified in relation to the different modules 
and indicators. In particular, how LGAF expert panels 
identify corruption and the terms they use to describe it 
vary from country to country. As a result, the LGAF data 
do not permit rigorous comparison between the different 
countries assessed, although the scorecards do permit 
insights into the quality of specific dimensions of land 
governance across countries (see Annex 2).  
That said, the qualitative data contained can be 
made fertile for a country-specific analysis of corruption 
in different areas of land governance. Although the 
LGAF does not use control of corruption as a stand-
alone dimension,13 its country reports elaborate actors, 
practices and risks of corruption when and as they relate 
to the five dimensions of land governance. Identifying 
the specific contexts in which they occur can provide a 
relatively fine-grained picture for particular countries. 
Thus, understanding the methodological limitations of the 
reports themselves, but seeking to explore the analytical 
potential of the qualitative data with regard to corruption 
in land governance, an exploratory text analysis was run, 
seeking to identify 1) different types of corruption and 
2) the dimensions and contexts of land governance and 
administration in which they occur. The methodology of 
this text analysis and hence also the findings are highly 
exploratory and tentative.14 However, as Box 5, as well as 
the visualisation of the findings in Annex 5, indicates, the 
tentative data illustrate how specific patterns, practices and 
contexts of corruption in land governance can be extracted 
from the country reports.
What can be seen immediately is that types of 
corruption and the dimensions of land governance 
in which they occur differ significantly from country 
to country. Nevertheless, some common themes and 
convergent patterns emerge. Bribery, informal fees and 
payments extracted from land service users appear 
overwhelmingly as the most common form of corruption. 
This occurs as a result of significant discretionary powers, 
a general lack of transparency and the prevalence of 
complex and cumbersome administrative procedures 
involving multiple steps and multiple agencies. These are 
most notable in the registration and allocation of land 
rights, in the approval of land use plans and the issue of 
building permits and in the provision of land information. 
Corruption affects urban land particularly, as land 
administration and the need for formal registrations of 
rights and approvals of plans are concentrated in urban 
areas. Rent-seeking and fraud by land officials involved in 
the acquisition and disposal of public land for residential 
and commercial development through organised schemes 
also entails payment of bribes and kickbacks to private 
surveyors and lawyers and others. Discretionary powers 
can be used to re-designate customary land as public 
land to enable it to be developed at a price premium. 
Moreover, in cases where customary authorities operate 
as landowners, they may also be directly involved in the 
corrupt allocation of customary land. Public or customary 
land users whose land is expropriated frequently receive 
no compensation, and the LGAF reports frequently cite 
corruption risks in relation to land acquisitions, including 
in land valuations, which determine the levels at which 
official land prices and liabilities to taxation are set. 
With a more developed and robust methodology for 
the analysis of corruption within the LGAF process, 
the identification and prioritisation of anti-corruption 
interventions in land governance could be put on a firmer 
evidence base, which would also allow for comparisons 
across countries and regions.   
3.3. Conclusions: Actors, institutions, 
assets and practices of corruption
The literature and data on land governance confirm 
the importance of a number of patterns underpinning 
corruption, in particular: 
 • the prevalence of discretionary power within land 
administration (including associated problems of 
fraudulent access to land, falsification of documents and 
rent-seeking by/bribery of officials and privileged access 
of elites to land titling schemes) 
 • the role of parallel institutions for land management, 
including clashes of customary and formal systems of 
authority (and, in this context, historically incomplete 
policies, institutions, legislation and land records) as 
a breeding ground for corruption and malpractice at 
multiple levels 
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14 See Annexes 3 and 4 for details on the methodology and the visualisation of further findings. 
 • corruption in the allocation and privatisation of 
public land, which emerges as a principal nexus 
for discretionary decision-making and political 
interference 
The increasing political and economic value of land 
has become one of the drivers of corruption and political 
patronage over the past decade, and the cases discussed 
above demonstrate how multiple actors are involved in 
corruption within the land sector. Corruption affects 
other government bodies involved in decision-making 
over land at central, municipal and local levels, not just 
land administration services per se. These include those 
responsible for spatial planning, surveying, revenue 
collection, the judiciary and allied sectors such as 
housing, agriculture, forests and mining, as well as land 
professionals, traders, investors, housing developers, banks, 
the legal profession and customary authorities (Durand 
Lasserve, 2015; Manji, 2012; Owen et al., 2015). Ordinary 
people at community and household levels become 
enmeshed in corruption, obliged to use their own limited 
assets and networks of influence to gain access to land or 
land services. Women are particularly vulnerable, given 
social, legal and bureaucratic discrimination, and suffer 
extortion and harassment, including sexual harassment. 
Many women can access services or decision-making 
processes only through male family members or authority 
figures (Ncube et al., 2015). 
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Box 5: Types and contexts of corruption in selected LGAF country reports
The 2011 LGAF Nigeria country report makes 34 references to informal fees and non-receipted payments to land 
officials, with a further 18 similar references to simple ‘corruption’, two references to exorbitant or excessive fees 
and one to rent-seeking. Informal fee payments were required in relation to land registration processes but also for 
enforcement of land rights, obtaining planning consents and access to land information. There are nine references 
to abuse by public officials and eight to illegal staff behaviour. Problems are particularly acute in urban areas, 
where formal land registration and building permits are required for residential developments but opaque and 
complex procedures create scope for rent-seeking and informal payments are required to facilitate processing of 
documents. Officials are involved in acquisition and onward leasing of public land or issue of certificates to occupy 
public land for exorbitant fees and prices. Land officials also fail to disclose public land information in order 
to protect their interests in these schemes. Informal fees must also be paid to lawyers, surveyors, planners and 
others involved in these land development processes. There are additional problems of delayed or non-payment 
of compensation in cases of land expropriation that occurs frequently in urban areas. Although there are some 
mechanisms in place to curb illegal actions by land officials, these were found not to be applied in practice.
The LGAF Malawi 2012 country report makes 33 references to bribery and corruption in provision of access 
to land services, four to the misuse of public land, three to lack of transparency and 15 to lack of compliance with 
the law. Bribery and corruption are cited most frequently in relation to the development and registration of urban 
land (seven instances) and land valuation and taxation (three instances) and also in dispute resolution and public 
land management (one instance). Restrictions on plot sizes and plot transfers in urban areas create opportunities 
for corruption, and informal payments are required for applicants to overcome planning controls, and to speed up 
the issue of building permits. The abuse of authority by public officials is most frequently cited in relation to the 
allocation of public lands: officials are involved in non-transparent administrative processes for disposal of public 
land through which they collect bribes, but may also dispose of land below market prices, reducing government 
revenue flows. The report makes nine references to lack of transparency in land management, particularly in 
relation to transactions involving public land. There are also problems of fake documentation of land transactions 
by people seeking documentation to enable land developments or sales. Although customary authorities in rural 
areas were found to be largely effective in land allocation and management, there are no effective systems for 
formal oversight of fraudulent disposals of customary land by chiefs, which is a growing problem. Unauthorised 
transfers of public land subject to common use in rural areas also take place, but customary land users subject 
to expropriation generally receive no compensation related to the value of the land, and are unaware of their 
entitlements in this respect.   
The LGAF Gambia 2013 country report cites corruption as a limitation in 53 instances. Most frequently, these 
involve informal fee payments to officials (16 references), with 13 references to simple ‘corruption’. There are 
12 references to ‘abuse’, 11 to non-compliance with the law, one to land-grabbing and one to illegal behaviour 
by officials. Demands for discretionary fee payments are cited as occurring most frequently in relation to land 
registration, at multiple stages of a complex process, and in relation to the leasing of rural land, but also in 
the non-collection of tax revenues, land valuations and the enforcement of property rights.  Following land 
registration, bribery and informal fee payments are cited most frequently in relation to illegal logging practices. 
A second principal area of concern is the discretionary application of rules in settling compensation payments in 
cases of expropriation and loss of land rights. Abuse of official authority is cited in relation to the designation of 
state land and the non-recognition of customary rights, the management of public land and the provision of land 
information, generally by senior land officials.  
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Land has become a key asset of power and patronage, 
and land corruption can be well organised in the corridors 
of power. Informal practices, reciprocal favours and 
obligations among corrupt networks emerge as the 
governing norms of land institutions subvert their public 
institutional purpose. Failure to supply land services to 
customary or informal rights-holders reflects the vested 
interests of officials in extracting bribes from the better-off 
and maintaining exclusive systems and inequitable laws 
and policies no longer fit for purpose (Durand Lasserve, 
2015; TI and FAO, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2014). 
Based on the evidence, a strong case can be made that 
corruption is a highly significant factor in shaping land 
governance at all levels. However, the political economy 
analysis profiles the following systemic features acting as 
enablers or drivers of all types of corruption:
1. Clientelistic networks and political corruption: In 
the case of most African countries, politics on all 
levels are heavily shaped by patronage and ‘big-
manism’. One widely documented effect is the political 
instrumentalisation of both formal and informal 
institutions and the quest for more control over 
lucrative assets that serve to support the network’s 
individual and collective power base.
2. A changing incentive structure owing to the rapid 
increase in land as a financial asset for individuals and 
companies: Not only have new, profit-oriented actors 
emerged, such as international companies and brokers, 
but even local actors, such as customary chiefs or young 
men in rural and peri-urban areas, are seeking financial 
gain from their traditional control over land. 
3. The rapid change in institutional and policy frameworks 
relating to land governance frequently complicates 
(rather than simplifies) a landscape already characterised 
by legal pluralism and multiple practices. In particular, 
lack of coherent and comprehensive procedures and 
enforcement mechanisms down to the local level, in 
addition to lack of experience and knowledge among 
both public officials and citizens of these changing 
policies, opens up significant room for abuse. They 
also strengthen the power of state authorities and of 
customary authorities, which does not necessarily lead 
to a reduction of corruption but rather to an increase 
in discretion and subsequent exclusion of marginalised 
citizens and members of the community, in particular 
women. 
To sum up, corruption in land governance can 
be a functional process, be it in terms of ‘practical’ 
governance (Olivier de Sardan, 2015) or as a coercive 
device structuring access to and control over land. The 
case studies demonstrate that, even where state-of-the-
art formal institutions exist, they lie within the wider 
dynamics of power relations. Power shapes and is framed 
by institutions, and institutions can also both strengthen 
and ‘tame’ it. It constrains what agents can do, but they 
can also generate, use and mobilise it to shape and change 
both institutions and the structures of power (Hudson 
and Leftwich, 2014). In other words, institutions are 
never isolated from their social environment, and both 
individuals and collective actors will seek to use and thus 
shape them as resourcefully as possible. Corruption is a 
prime resource for all actors concerned. In many cases, 
this resource has become itself an institutionalised ‘culture 
of corruption’. Even when incentives and the institutional 
structure change, actors may not respond in a uniform 
manner. Indeed, in many cases, actors will continue 
to mobilise a range of practices, frequently privileging 
corruption from the experience that it works to gain 
control over and retain assets or to access services and 
other resources. 
4. Corruption and large-
scale agricultural 
investment
4.1. Introduction 
In the past decade, large-scale agricultural investments in 
the Global South have increased significantly. Driving this 
heightened investment activity are changing international 
investment patterns, fuelled on the one hand by new 
commercial incentives such as rising commodity prices 
and on the other by changes and adaptations in national 
investment policies designed to stimulate agricultural 
productivity and economic growth. As a result, rural land 
in developing countries and so-called ‘frontier markets’ 
have become a very attractive asset for international 
investors of all kinds. This changing environment brings 
new actors as well as new relationships to the fore, in 
particular between investors, international companies, host 
country governments and local communities (Arezki et 
al., 2015; Borras et al., 2011; Cotula, 2012; Cotula et al., 
2009; Peluso and Lund, 2011). 
One useful way to conceptualise the different levels and 
identify specific actors and their interrelationships of large-
scale agricultural investments is their positioning within 
the investment chain, a concept that focuses on the ‘flow 
and distribution of money up and down the chain’ (Cotula 
and Blackmore, 2014: 9). This is particularly relevant for a 
political economy analysis of corruption in relation to land 
investment, as it distinguishes relevant levels of agricultural 
investment and associated actors. 
The upstream level includes parent companies, investors 
and lenders. The midstream level is the core of the chain, with 
the company managing the project at the centre, associated 
with a range of actors and financial flows. Here, multiple 
stakeholders interact, from government agencies in the host 
country to contractors and, in some cases, local communities, 
in financial flows, exchanges and arrangements involved 
in securing the necessary contracts and land concessions. 
The downstream level refers to local suppliers, processors, 
transporters and buyers (i.e. wholesalers, transporters and 
retailers) and lastly everyday consumers of the product. On 
each level, specific incentives of the different actors can be 
discerned. Relationships change according to the negotiations 
between and decisions taken, which in turn are framed by 
the relevant assets (e.g. capital, land), institutional structure 
(e.g. national laws in host and home countries) and power 
relations (e.g. between political elites and local communities). 
The practices and patterns of corruption are specific to each 
level, and interventions need to be tailored accordingly.  
The following sections discuss corruption risks 
pertaining to the nature of contract negotiations and 
the governance framework of host countries (Section 
4.2). Section 4.3 looks at some difficulties regarding the 
identification of specific practices of corruption and legal 
evidence and Section 4.4 presents some conclusions, 
analysing corruption risks along the investment chain, with 
a focus on the upstream and midstream level. 
4.2. Corruption, land governance and large-
scale agricultural investment
Discussions of the relationship between agribusiness 
investment and corruption seem to attract two 
contradictory assumptions. On the one hand, it is widely 
assumed such projects generate numerous macro or 
microeconomic benefits, such as improving employment, 
food security or revenue in the host country, and are 
therefore entirely rational in the public interest and 
no more prone to corruption than other economic 
activities. On the other hand, they may be seen as 
always and inherently tainted with corruption, lack of 
transparency, exclusion and frequently human rights 
abuses, as encapsulated in the term ‘land-grabbing’. 
From our assessment of the available literature and data, 
there is insufficient evidence to support either of these 
assumptions, and the realities are likely to be highly 
context-dependent. Practices deemed ‘corrupt’, including 
the prevalence of bribery and rent-seeking and the seizing 
of opportunities for private gain, may well be side-effects 
of weak institutions; low levels of human capital; low 
staff remuneration; the absence of legitimate business 
opportunities for personal gain; high levels of discretionary 
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power; and inadequate or contradictory regulatory, 
legislative and policy frameworks. In other words, it is 
very difficult to distinguish between corruption risks at 
the investment project level and those at the sector and 
national level, as they are heavily interdependent. 
This assessment identifies four principal underlying 
factors shaping corruption risks in large-scale agricultural 
investment projects:
1. Lack of transparency
2. Weak governance in host countries
3. Lack of accountability and low legal literacy
4. Impunity
4.2.1 Lack of transparency 
Perhaps the greatest corruption risk is the widespread 
lack of publically available information on the details 
of contracts. The ‘[l]ack of transparency and of 
checks and balances in contract negotiations creates a 
breeding ground for corruption and deals that do not 
maximise the public interest’ (Cotula et al., 2009: 7). 
This makes it very difficult for citizens to assess both 
harmful and beneficial impacts, undermining democratic 
accountability on a national and international level and 
preventing people from scrutinising government decisions 
on large-scale agricultural investments (Anseeuw et al., 
2013; Blackmore et al., 2015; Global Witness, 2012; 
MacInnes, 2015; Oxfam, 2012). From the perspective of 
international NGOs, the critique extends to the funding 
policies of multilateral banks such as the European 
Investment Bank and the World Bank (ActionAid, 2014: 
20–3; see also Oram, 2012). 
4.2.2 Weak governance in host countries
There is robust evidence to support the claim that high 
frequency of large-scale land deal-making is concentrated 
in countries with weak governance, although the evidence 
also suggests high levels of corruption can tend to dissuade 
FDI generally (TI and FAO, 2011). Also, the successful 
development of land concessions and effective returns to 
investments may be associated with stronger governance 
arrangements (Arezki et al., 2015; Bujko et al., 2016). 
A study by Oxfam (2013) on the relationship between 
governance and land deals finds that, of the 56 countries 
where large-scale land deals were agreed between 2000 and 
2011, 78% scored below average on four key governance 
indicators used by the World Bank: accountability to citizens, 
rule of law, quality of private sector regulation and control 
of corruption. It also found the average score across these 
four governance indicators in countries where large land 
deals were present was 30% lower than in countries where 
they were not (see Oram, 2014). As Deininger and Byerlee 
(2011) state, ‘the risks associated with such investments are 
immense. Case studies confirm that in many cases public 
institutions were unable to cope with the surge of demand 
[…], and that legal provisions were unclear and not well-
disseminated or known by rights holders’ (p.244). 15
The LGAF scorecards corroborate the problem of weak 
institutional frameworks for the regulation of large-scale 
land acquisition in host countries, as Table 1 shows.
Out of the 16 indicators, no African country achieves more 
than three As (Senegal three, Democratic Republic of Congo 
two, Madagascar one, South Africa one) and there are no 
more than four Bs (Madagascar four, Senegal three, Ghana 
two, Nigeria one). The vast majority of scores are Cs and Ds 
– even in middle-income countries such as South Africa.
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problems, see de Schutter (2011). 
Table 1: LGAF Scoring for Large-Scale Land Acquisition
Source: Deininger et al. (2014: 86).
Academic surveys have sought to provide a more 
rigorous analysis of this relationship. A recent study focuses 
on the correlation between level of corruption control and 
size of agricultural investment (rather than FDI generally; 
Bujko et al., 2016). Analysing a large dataset from the Land 
Matrix Database and the World Governance Indicators, 
the statistical evidence robustly backs claims that weak 
governance environments and low levels of corruption 
control attract larger land deals (Bujko et al., 2016). 
Another study goes a step further in its assessment. 
Arezki et al. (2015) conclude that, whereas agribusiness 
investor interest was indeed higher in countries with weak 
governance frameworks, this may be a period-specific 
snapshot that does not do justice to the changing incentive 
structure driving investors’ behaviour currently and in future. 
‘[The] evidence implies that better land governance, 
increased transparency, and a more consistent global 
and national effort at monitoring could be conducive 
to attracting capable investors in a number of ways, 
particularly by (i) improving the ability to identify 
responsible and qualified investors ex ante and to 
effectively negotiate with them to maximize local 
benefits by integrating existing producers into value 
chains; (ii) ensuring that land occupied by non-viable 
ventures can be transferred to more efficient producers 
quickly; (iii) allowing responsible investors to 
distinguish themselves to reduce risk and, ideally, their 
cost of capital; and (iv) providing a basis for learning 
from experience to develop successful business models.’ 
In view of the falling prices of commodities, governments 
seeking to attract large-scale agricultural investment projects 
are now facing a more competitive environment, and the 
quality of overall as well as land governance may well be 
gaining increased weight as a key risk assessment criterion 
for investors and a competitive factor for governments.
4.2.3. Lack of accountability and ‘legal illiteracy’
Another problem associated with weak governance is 
the limited ability of land users to demand and enforce 
accountability. Exploring the processes through which 
large-scale land transfers affect customary rights in four 
African countries, German et al. (2013) state that: 
‘[The] most obvious concern was the widespread 
absence of downward accountability of those with the 
legal authority to make decisions over customary or 
village land. More often than not, customary authorities 
were found to make decision based on opportunities 
for personal gain rather than collective interests. The 
limited ability of customary land users to question the 
authority of local and customary leaders, whether due 
to custom, intimidation, coercion by outside actors, or 
legal illiteracy, was also paramount’ (p.15)
Lack of accountability and legal literacy on a local level 
are exacerbated by, first, lack of recognition and respect for 
existing rights and, second, uneven public provision of land 
information on a national level. The LGAF scoring for 10 
African countries provides evidence that both dimensions 
fall short in African countries (Deininger et al., 2014; for 
the tables see Annex 2).
4.2.4 Impunity
Weak legal frameworks and unaccountable processes 
framing large-scale land deals, coupled with strong 
incentives for rent-seeking behaviour by elites (German 
et al., 2013), make the justice system susceptible to 
manipulation. As Box 6 illustrates, large-scale investments 
can be linked to subversion, distortion or abuse of the 
rule of law and enforcement agencies (Crabtree-Condor 
and Casey, 2012; Global Witness, 2012; MacInnes, 2015). 
Although corruption is not the sole cause or characteristic 
of such land grabs that may be linked to human rights 
abuses, it acts as a powerful medium for increasing power 
imbalances and ‘violent exclusions’ (MacInnes, 2015: 14). 
4.3. Evidence of corruption in agribusiness
The fact that corruption poses a problem for multinational 
enterprises is confirmed in a recent survey on International 
Business Attitudes to Corruption. Nearly half of 
respondents said ‘facilitation payments’ were essential or 
significant in keeping their business going (Control Risk, 
2015: 37),16 in spite of widespread corporate anti-bribery 
policies (see Box 7). 
16 Only 3% of the companies surveyed identified themselves as being in agriculture and agribusiness. In the survey, they are subsumed under other sectors 
(see Control Risk 2015: 42). However, sectors that are listed include oil, gas and minerals and construction/real estate, both of which are highly significant 
for land governance and corruption in low-income countries. 
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Box 6: Land-grabbing, limited state capacity and 
impunity in Pakistan
‘Limited state capacity to enforce laws, little local 
awareness of land rights, and tenure systems that 
are often used selectively for private gain, all create 
a perceived impunity for “land grabbers”. Pakistan’s 
land governance institutional framework is geared 
towards agricultural development and revenue 
collection. Its weakness in safeguarding rights 
is a result of a revenue-based rather than rights-
based approach. Within institutions, low technical 
capacity and lack of accurate data for adequate 
forecasting and baselines means there is limited 
accountability and transparency’ (Crabtree-Condor 
and Casey, 2012: 52).
However, in spite of the frequency of facilitation payments, 
as well as the corruption risks identified in host countries and 
the high media attention that ‘land-grabbing’ enjoys, there is 
a notable lack of evidence that corruption is more prevalent 
in large-scale agricultural investment projects than in other 
international business operations. For instance, the 2014 
OECD Foreign Bribery Report (2014a: 21–2) found 59% 
of foreign bribery cases occurred in four sectors: extractives, 
construction, transportation and storage and information 
and communication. The ‘agriculture, forestry and fishing 
sector accounted for only 4%. The authors also undertook 
a media search to identify cases of alleged corruption, in 
particular those involving charges in large-scale agricultural 
investment projects. The search came up with only a handful 
of cases, with very few rendering clear-cut evidence of types 
and practices of corruption. This lack of evidence does 
not necessarily mean no corruption is involved in such 
investment projects. Other factors outlined above, such as 
non-transparent contractual arrangements, legal illiteracy of 
communities and political pressure on the justice system, may 
account for the lack of clearly identifiable cases (see Section 
5.3.2 for further elaborations of this point). 
Beyond the scant hard evidence of corruption in land 
investments, review of the literature suggests further aspects 
merit attention. Corruption may be just one factor within 
a more messy and complex politico-economic setting. In 
countries with weak land governance and uneven property 
rights, issues such as food security, livelihoods and social 
identity are at stake when land transactions are abused, 
which explains why large-scale agricultural investments 
frequently trigger social conflict (Lund, 2013; Nolte, 2013; 
Richards, 2013). For instance, Ethiopia recently abandoned 
its plans to expand the capital city in the wake of violently 
repressed protests over a government land appropriation for 
private investors in a traditional farming area (see Davison, 
2016). Accusations of corruption were but one factor 
fuelling the protests. Similar examples of abound (Hall et al., 
2015b), illustrating that the political will of host countries 
to commit to better land governance and accountability 
practices plays an important role in creating a more 
inclusive and less volatile political environment.  
Large-scale agricultural projects are in jeopardy if 
local citizens resist them when they perceive them to have 
negative social and environmental impacts, and especially 
if they see them as tainted with corruption. Not only 
does this pose a financial risk to agribusiness, but also it 
tarnishes company reputations and creates reputational 
risk for land investment as a whole, and for governments 
wishing to utilise it to promote growth and development. 
4.4. Conclusions: Corruption risks along the 
investment chain 
A large number of corruption risks can be identified along the 
investment chain, although the literature review indicates the 
evidence may be somewhat skewed: whereas there is much 
literature documenting the ‘demand side’ of corruption – that 
is, the bribes and favours public officials in the host country 
demand – there is to date little hard evidence underscoring 
the ‘supply side’ of corruption – the bribes and favours the 
company grants to public officials and other individuals.17
Table 2 seeks to identify the actors and specific 
corruption risks at each level of the investment chain.18 
We highlight the midstream level as the one most subject 
to corruption risks related to in-country land governance. 
In the third column, bold font is used to indicate those 
corruption risks that in our judgement would benefit 
from further research to identify the weak points that are 
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weaknesses of national and international anti-corruption efforts in the next section. 
18 The levels identified along the investment chain do not correspond directly to the sectoral, national and international levels of analysis in Figure 1. 
However, taken together, they are useful to identify different actors, incentives, assets and relationships that frame corruption risks. 
Box 7: International Business Attitudes to Corruption Survey 2014/15
Control Risks, a global risk consulting firm, conducted a survey with 638 companies operating across the world 
on their attitudes to corruption. The results are highly insightful. Although an impressive 84.9% of companies 
surveyed say they have an anti-bribery policy in place (Control Risk, 2015: 22), in practice the findings ‘point 
to a disconnect between what head offices believe about the adequacy and effectiveness of their anti-corruption 
programme and what actually happens in the higher risk markets – this is the ‘remote office’ problem. [...] These 
days many companies are good at talking about principles. Not all of them are able to demonstrate that they put 
principles into practice’ (ibid.: 8–9; emphasis added). 
Another interesting insight regards corporate dealings with seemingly entrenched corruption, for example in specific 
government departments. The survey comes to the conclusion that, even in these cases, ‘it is usually possible for companies 
to secure the services that they require without paying bribes, but it requires a much higher degree of management 
determination, and a willingness to accept ‘wasted’ time and higher costs. Long term changes require institutional reform, 
and this should be seen as a legitimate target for company lobbying, for example through chambers of commerce’ (ibid.: 
40; emphasis added). For more detailed findings on corruption risks of international business, see Annex 5. 
most amenable to corruption in the investment chain, 
which concerted national and international action against 
corruption in land acquisition could address.  
To conclude, recent large-scale land aquisitions for 
agribusiness have been concentrated in countries with a 
high risk of corruption. It is not clear, however, to what 
extent the agribusiness land sector poses corruption risks 
that are greater or different in kind to those in other types 
of attractive business opportunities in specific countries 
and regions. If the patterns of corruption are found to be 
similar across sectors and chains of actors, initiatives to 
improve governance and the rule of law generally in host 
countries will benefit the agribusiness sector. Where the 
problem is specific to this sector, a more targeted approach 
is warranted. This would apply, for instance, at an upstream 
level to the lack of transparency and publicly available 
information on formal contractual agreements between 
companies and host governments. At a midstream level, it 
would apply to the amount of discretion and lack of clear 
standards governing the interactions between companies and 
local (frequently customary) authorities. 
Key corruption risks identified are impunity of political 
elites in securing favourable land allocations, leading 
to elite capture of international land deals, associated 
kickbacks and profits from commercial land development 
and the use of land for political patronage. Of particular 
concern is the risk of corruption at the midstream level, 
associated with larger-scale investments, agricultural 
development corridors and their supply chains. Here, 
small- to medium-scale investors, including national and 
local elites and those with political connections, are able to 
exploit rent-seeking behaviour by land officials and weak 
land governance arrangements to secure land allocations 
and override the rights and interests of less powerful 
land users. Moreover, these risks can easily cascade 
into downstream corruption, involving local suppliers, 
smallholders, company agents, communities and officials. 
This undermines legitimate business relationships and 
exacerbates land conflict generally. At this point, however, 
effective tools and more comprehensive research to help 
monitor and evaluate corruption risks along the investment 
chain are lacking, leading to a notable absence of data. 
The following section assesses existing anti-corruption 
policies and frameworks in light of these findings and those 
discussed in Section 3.
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Table 2: Corruption Risks along the Investment Chain
Investment 
chain level
Actors/relationships Corruption risks
Upstream investors
high net worth individuals
commercial banks
pension funds
mutual funds
life insurance firms
sovereign wealth funds
development finance institutions
lenders
asset management firms
opaque structuring of corporate entities
lack of beneficial ownership information
potential for facilitation and other undisclosed payments/ownership 
interests
lack of transparency and publicly available information on formal and 
informal contracts
Midstream company
host government (unofficial and official relationships with 
government officials, politically exposed persons (PEPs) and 
agents)
trade associations and employees
enterprise affiliates, brokers and agents
customary and community leaders
political corruption
collusion of public officials with investor and operator companies to 
secure direct payments or other favours for their benefit in exchange for 
land- and profit-related concessions
conflict of interest
‘facilitation payments’ to and via brokers and agents
bribery of local officials and customary leaders
Down-stream contractors/suppliers
buyers
lack of transparency of contractual relationships between company and 
contractors and suppliers (including outgrowers and contract farmers) 
and local community landholders
kickbacks in subcontracting
conflicts of interest by government officials involved in private business
Source: Authors.
5. Assessment of relevant 
land governance reforms 
and anti-corruption 
interventions
5.1. Introduction
This section considers the relevance and effectiveness of 
approaches to mitigating corruption in land governance. The 
following sections outline selected measures and assess them 
with regard to their effectiveness in targeting corruption in 
land governance. We pay particular attention to the findings 
of the political economy analysis and their implications. 
5.2. National governance level in host 
countries
5.2.1 Legislative and policy approaches
The political economy analysis underlines some critical 
points for effective and sustainable anti-corruption and 
governance reforms. In particular, vested interests within 
land administrations at all levels of the hierarchy make 
it difficult to reform land administration from inside. 
Where corruption is systemic and politicised, all attempts 
to reform from within the system are likely to fail, and 
alternative approaches that are at least partly independent 
of government are likely to be needed. Reforms are 
dependent on political dynamics and may need to bide 
their time until appropriate political moments. They 
also may need longer-term approaches to legislative and 
institutional change, so individuals and collective actors 
can adapt to, understand, internalise and mobilise them. 
This underscores the importance of political will, 
which is absolutely central to real reform. Introduction of 
systems for greater transparency and accountability from 
the outside in the absence of political will and acceptance 
is likely to be problematic. However, under certain 
conditions, it may be feasible to promote a race to the 
top or to impose conditionalities and sanctions in favour 
of these. This may form part of longer-term strategies to 
promote reform in corrupt states (von Furstenberg, 2001).
Generally speaking, anti-corruption measures are most 
effective when other contextual factors support them 
and when they are integrated into a broader package 
of institutional reforms. For instance, public financial 
management reforms are effective in reducing corruption. 
In the right circumstances, supreme audit institutions, 
social accountability mechanisms and organised civil 
society can be effective (Menocal Rocha and Taxell, 2015). 
Such measures are aimed at the national level, but help 
reduce the scope of corruption, increase accountability 
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Box 8: Reasons for not reporting cases of bribery
One interesting insight emerging from the data in the East African Bribery Index relates to the rationale of citizens’ 
responses to demands of bribery. The first telling finding is that most citizens do not report such cases. Second, and 
very interestingly, the reasons differ significantly from country to country. As the report states, ‘about 90% of the 
respondents that encountered a bribery incident did not report or make a complaint to any authority or person. 
In Kenya, most of the respondents said they did not know where to report while in Tanzania most felt that no 
action would be taken to resolve their complaint. In Burundi and Uganda, most individuals that did not report 
attributed this to the fact that they were beneficiaries of the bribery transaction. In Rwanda, most were afraid of 
self-incrimination’ (TI Kenya, 2015: xi).
and prevent the systemic capture of state institutions in 
converting and developing customary and public land for 
private commercial use. 
Key to governance and anti-corruption reforms across 
sectors is the strengthening of the rule of law and legal 
framework. This includes ensuring the coherence and 
comprehensiveness of anti-corruption laws, securing the 
independence of law enforcement and investigation bodies 
from political influence and empowering accountability 
bodies (such as parliamentary committees or law 
commissions). However, evidence across the literature 
shows rule of law and accountability mechanisms on a local 
and national level are not only uneven but also frequently 
undermined by political corruption, abuse of power by 
chiefs and local officials and lack of information accessible 
to communities and citizens (see Owen et al., 2015).
5.2.2 Reform and capacity-building in land 
administration 
Seeking to establish simpler, more transparent, systems for 
land registration and management of land transactions 
has been a dominant approach for donors. Such measures 
include, among other things, safeguards against corrupt 
practice, sometimes combined with attention to legislative 
and policy reforms to make land administration systems 
more inclusive (Wren Lewis, 2012). However, simply 
providing technical assistance, building capacity and 
introducing new systems, standards and procedures has 
been widely demonstrated to be ineffective. In particular, 
strengthening audits and supervisory controls on land 
administration have proved lacking for a number of 
reasons (Durand Lasserve, 2015):  
 • Corruption leaves little administrative or accounting trace.
 • Staff in government land administration agencies manifest 
opposition to control measures, sometimes at a very high level.
 • Sanctions against illicit practices and corruption are not 
really dissuasive given the profit they generate.
Simplification of tenure formalisation and delivery of 
real property rights have been regularly attempted over the 
past two decades, with very poor results. As the previous 
sections demonstrate, this owes partly to poor institutional 
frameworks, but is mainly because actors’ incentive 
structure privileges both petty and grand corruption 
over more law-abiding practices. This is compounded by 
increasingly unequal control over assets and subsequent 
widening political and economic power inequalities. 
There have been successful interventions from which 
lessons can be learnt. In various West African countries, 
land administration support programmes have employed 
preventive measures to limit the decisional power of central 
and local government officials with regard to land transfers 
and allocations. These have focused on strengthening two 
critical dimensions: the completeness and transparency 
of the cadastre; and community participation and 
accountability (Durand Lasserve, 2015, Owen et al., 2015). 
With this in mind, pragmatic engagement using specific, 
targeted measures that address problems resulting from local 
political economy dynamics is required to allow administrative 
reforms to succeed and to overcome the resistance of 
established land institutions. In Mali, this involved:
 • a moratorium suspending land development projects and 
the allocation and transfer of public land and the conversion 
of peri-urban rural land for urban development and 
 • clamping down on the legality of land allocation, 
conversion and transfers, resulting in the indictment and 
prosecution of several officials; a detailed control of titled 
land allocation is currently being undertaken in the archives 
of the Directorate of the Sate Domains and Cadastre
This approach requires an in-depth understanding of the 
procedures, mechanisms, financial circuits, institutions and 
stakeholders and incentives, especially in relation to the 
operation of land delivery systems and markets; interaction 
between formal and informal markets; and coexistence 
of delivery channels and price systems. Durand Lasserve 
(2015) recommends attention focus on a limited number 
of key steps and institutions, rather than any attempt to 
impose comprehensive reforms from the outside. 
At a pragmatic level, DFID’s own donor-assisted 
land tenure security and land administration reform 
programmes report consistent lessons. The construction 
of systems that incorporate all legitimate tenure rights, 
provide safe and secure management of land records 
and assist land transactions in line with approved legal 
regulations is fundamental. DAI, a major land consulting 
firm working in Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Tanzania and elsewhere, reports that, in its 
experience, a number of types of measures are important 
in reducing opportunities for corrupt behaviours (Richard 
Baldwin, personal communication, 19 February 2016):
 • Validation and agreement of land rights at the 
community level: This involves agreement of clear 
procedures in advance, sufficient well-trained staff 
extensive outreach, maximum publicity, involvement of 
local community-based organisations and provision for 
community-based advice surgeries and dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Where existing systems do not provide 
clear documented evidence of existing land rights, 
and this situation is maintained with the support of 
political or social elites and land officials, and especially 
if public land assets are effectively being privatised, 
there are risks of corruption in obtaining land titles or 
certificates. Therefore, the organisation of transparent 
and accountable processes that document or regularise 
unregistered land rights is a necessary first step. 
 • Automation of land record systems to provide secure 
management: This involves the introduction of digital 
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record systems with off-site back-up that are more 
difficult to falsify or destroy; standardised definitions 
of parcels, properties and tenure rights and business 
processes; and automated capture and storage of 
information, with adequate levels of security (authorised 
users and clear audit trails to track transactions and 
changes) and with additional automated systems 
specifically designed to prevent fraud, for example by 
integrating and linking parcel maps, land rights registers 
and sales value/transaction information and freezing 
land records during pending transactions to prevent 
premature alteration abuse. Support to the development 
of such systems must also include arrangements for 
their regular maintenance and updating to ensure they 
can be sustainably managed once donor support ends. 
The next section explores the broader potential of new 
technology to assist in curbing corruption.
 • In addition, privatisation of public assets is a one-off 
activity that requires special legal, organisation and 
institutional support, closely monitored by government, 
as demonstrated by the wealth of literature on the 
large-scale privatisation processes in Eastern Europe 
in the 1990s. In an urban context, the link between 
land values and permissible uses means the former can 
rise uncontrollably as a result of failures to regulate 
land use, leading to vicious cycles of escalating value, 
corrupt transactions and social exclusion, as described 
by Durand Lasserve for Mali (2015),). Establishing 
effective planning and permit systems reduces 
corruption opportunities, although planning systems 
are themselves not corruption-free: transparency and 
accountability in planning and land administration 
reform need to be pursued hand-in-hand. 
5.2.3 Technology-based innovations in land 
administration 
Appropriately designed technology-based innovations 
have potentially important roles to play in this context. 
According to Bertot et al (2010), information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) can reduce corruption 
by promoting good governance, strengthening reform-
oriented initiatives, reducing potential for corrupt 
behaviours, enhancing relationships between government 
employees and citizens, allowing for citizen tracking of 
activities and monitoring and controlling behaviours 
of government employees (Shim and Eom, 2008). To 
successfully reduce corruption, however, ICT-enabled 
initiatives generally must move from increasing access to 
information to ensuring rules are transparent and applied, 
while also building abilities to track the decisions and 
actions of government employees (Bhatnagar, 2003). 
A key approach is to exploit the capacity of geographic 
and land information system (GIS and LIS) software to make 
land and cadastral information publically available online 
to increase transparency. In India, putting rural property 
records online greatly increased the speed at which they 
could be accessed and updated, simultaneously removing 
previously rampant opportunities for local officials to accept 
bribes (Bhatnagar, 2003). The electronic land record system 
in Karnataka is estimated to have saved 7 million farmers 
1.32 million working days in waiting time and Rs. 806 
million in bribes to local officials in its first several years. 
Prior to its introduction, the average land transfer required 
Rs. 100 in bribes; the electronic system requires only a one-
off fee payment of Rs. 2 (World Bank, 2004).
Other ICT-based approaches proposed to assist in 
curbing land corruption include:
 • the potential of mobile phones to enable crowdsourcing 
and democratisation of land information and 
administration systems (McLaren, 2010) and 
 • the use of technology-based solutions to prevent 
fraud, multiple land allocations and rent-seeking, in 
particular the scope to secure land registries based on 
open sourced information through the use of ‘block 
chain technology’, which underpins the use of virtual 
currencies such as Bitcoin (Memoris, 2015: 59–60)
In addition, use of social media also has some potential 
in terms of anti-corruption, which may be applicable to 
land, for example in providing access to open-sourced 
data on land rights and use and offering land users 
the opportunity to challenge corrupt official decisions. 
According to Bertot et al. (2010), social media has four 
major potential strengths: collaboration, participation, 
empowerment and timeliness. Collaborative and 
participatory in nature and defined by social interaction, 
it enables users to connect with each other and to form 
communities to socialise, share information or achieve a 
common goal. An example is the Twitter hashtag common 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, #whatwouldmagufulido, modelling 
the Tanzanian president as a new breed of African leader 
(Kalyegira, 2015; Meyer, 2016).
Despite the potential of ICT to reduce corruption 
in land administration, in the absence of political will 
to apply it to reduce complexity and discretion and to 
improve transparency in land administration, it does not 
promise rapid solutions in its own right. It thus needs to be 
applied as part of a broader strategy.
5.3. Large-scale agricultural investments 
and agribusiness
5.3.1 Legal mechanisms in upstream jurisdictions 
and liability risks of investors
The concern of this section is the degree to which investors 
and parents risk liability in other stages for the acts of 
those under them. The risks, safeguards and known 
examples of corruption in agribusiness land deals mean 
high-level investors, institutional and corporate, are 
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increasingly subject to disclosure requirements, sanctions 
and reputational risks sufficient to discourage active 
or acquiescent participation in bribery schemes and to 
encourage adequate steps to ensure affiliates, partners and 
agents avoid corrupt acts.  
The most important international legal and regulatory 
frameworks include the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA). This covers ‘issuers’: US and foreign companies 
that sell securities on the US exchanges and are registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 
addition to its anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA imposes 
accurate books and records filing obligations on issuers 
and requires them to maintain effective internal controls 
throughout their corporate operations, including joint 
ventures. In bribery cases, the SEC alleges violations of 
the ‘books and records’ and ‘internal accounting controls’ 
provisions and typically settles with the defendant company. 
An SEC settlement can include fines, injunctive relief, 
compliance plans and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains as a 
result of illegal activities. The point is that enforcement can 
police corruption across levels in the chain of actors. The 
settlement process minimises the need for hard proof of 
in-country corruption and can prompt other organisations 
to take action (see Box 9). The Department of Justice (DOJ) 
also brings FCPA cases, including criminal prosecutions. 
The FCPA cases receive worldwide attention and can 
have serious financial and reputational repercussions for 
offending companies in other jurisdictions as well.
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA also cover all 
domestic persons, whether or not issuers, and whether 
or not the acts were committed in the US. They also 
cover foreign individuals and entities for acts committed 
in the US, including via communications in interstate 
commerce. The FCPA makes illegal corrupt payments 
to ‘foreign officials’, who include ‘officers or employees 
of a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign 
government’. The US government has advocated 
successfully for an expansive reach of these provisions 
in recent years. Potentially significant for large-scale 
agricultural investments projects is that compelling legal 
arguments have been made for classifying aboriginal or 
tribal leaders as foreign officials under the FCPA.19 
The UK Bribery Act of 2010, which took force on 1 July 
2011, also imposes criminal liability for bribery across the 
chain of actors. The ‘failure to prevent bribery’ provision 
of Section 7 makes ‘commercial organisations’ responsible 
for bribing ‘foreign public officials’ by ‘associated 
persons’. Commercial organisations are corporations 
and partnerships organised under UK law, whether or 
not doing business in the UK, and foreign concerns that 
do business in the UK. Associated persons are essentially 
those performing a service for the organisation, such as 
subsidiaries, employees and agents. Foreign public official 
is broadly defined, essentially anyone performing a public 
function in the country. Payments to foreign officials 
that are allowed under the laws of the country are not 
19 See under http://jtl.columbia.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2015/12/Foster_54-CJTL-59.pdf. In addition, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in its 
Phase 3 review of US implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention commended US efforts to combat transnational bribery and cited best practices. 
The review played a part in the publication by the DOJ and the SEC of an extensive FCPA resource guide. The DOJ website publishes the FCPA in 50 
languages and offers an opinion procedure.
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Box 9: An illustrative, non-land-related, example of a successful international anti-corruption case
Tokyo-based, Hitachi Ltd. created a South African subsidiary in 2005 to pursue contracts to build two power 
plants worth $6.5 billion, and sold 25% of the subsidiary to a local company it knew was a front for the African 
National Congress, agreeing to pay the company a ‘success’ fee if the subsidiary was awarded the contract 
‘substantially as a result’ of the company’s efforts. The agreement also provided for profit-sharing with the 
company. The subsidiary won the contract and paid the company $1 million as a success fee and approximately 
$5 million as a ‘dividend’. The subsidiary inaccurately recorded these amounts on its books as ‘consulting fees’ and 
‘dividends declared’, rather than as influence payments to a political party, which reports were consolidated with 
Hitachi’s financial statements and filed with the SEC. Following an investigation in which the SEC was assisted 
by the DOJ Fraud Section, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department of 
the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the South African Financial Services Board, the SEC brought a FCPA 
case against Hitachi in the US District Court, alleging violations of the books and records and internal accounting 
controls requirements. The basis for jurisdiction was Hitachi’s registration with the SEC for US depositary shares, 
which were listed and traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The FCPA covers payments to 1) any foreign 
official; 2) any foreign political party or official thereof; 3) any candidate for foreign political office; or 4) any 
person, while knowing that all or a portion of the payment will be offered, given or promised to an individual 
falling within one of these three categories, in this case knowingly to a political party via a front company. Hitachi 
and the SEC settled the case with court approval in November 2015. Hitachi agreed to pay a $19 million penalty 
and to be enjoined from future violations without admitting to the allegations.
On 4 December 2015, AfDB announced it had reached an agreement with Hitachi that debars the company 
from participating in AfDB projects for 12 months with release conditioned on the company implementing AfDB 
integrity guidelines.
considered bribery. It is a defence for the organisation to 
prove it had in place adequate procedures designed to 
prevent associated persons from undertaking such conduct. 
Although these provisions will be judicially interpreted 
as more cases are brought under the law, they are generally 
straightforward and inclusive. In November 2015, the 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) concluded its first Section 7 
case against a financial services organisation, resulting in 
a deferred prosecution agreement, fines and restitution 
and compliance measures. In addition to paving the way 
for other Section 7 actions, this case is instructive in 
that it involved a complex corporate structure and set of 
actors. Significant, too, is the SFO’s close cooperation in 
the investigation with the DOJ and the SEC and the SEC’s 
separate consent decree with the defendant, relying on US 
securities laws where the jurisdictional requirements of the 
FCPA were not present.
The OECD Anti Bribery Convention ‘is the only legally 
binding instrument globally to focus primarily on the 
supply of bribes to foreign public officials in international 
business transactions’. It rests ‘on the engagement with 
major economic players to create a fair, level playing field. 
In 2013, its Working Group adopted an updated global 
relations strategy which identifies not only countries 
for potential accession to the Convention; but also, 
countries with which working relations would be mutually 
beneficial’ (OECD, 2014b: 8, 28). The Working Group 
Annual Report (2014b) describes its engagement efforts 
and implementation reviews for its 41 parties. 
The Working Group collects and publishes enforcement 
data by country, although not at a level of detail showing 
whether any actions were against players in large land 
deals. However, the convention has been criticised for 
being toothless, as the political will in home countries 
for its enforcement is seen to be lacking.20 What merits 
attention, though, is that the convention does provide some 
interesting inroads into engaging with powerful non-
OECD countries, such as China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, as part of its global relations strategy. How 
far these prove effective in mainstreaming and enforcing 
anti-bribery principles remains to be seen. 
The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
addresses preventive measures, criminalisation and 
law enforcement, international cooperation and the 
recovery of stolen assets, thus providing a comprehensive 
framework to address the causes and effects of corruption 
at all levels.21 The Convention of State Parties monitors 
implementation in member countries. UNCAC also 
stipulates anti-bribery measures. A key problem with 
implementation of the preventive measures and law 
enforcement is lack of political will and the political 
corruption undermining reforms in countries with weak 
governance frameworks (Hechler et al., 2011).
Further initiatives include the 2013/14 G20 Anti-
Corruption Plan which calls on G20 governments to continue 
efforts to combat bribery, including establishing the liability of 
legal persons and engaging with the OECD Convention (see 
Box 10). The EITI adopted in December 2015 a requirement 
for its 49 members to report beneficial ownership of 
companies doing business in the extractive industries. Civil 
society and the media are already calling for compliance in 
their respective countries (Tax Justice Network, 2016).22
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20 For data on the enforcement of the convention, see http://www.oecd.org/corruption/ dataonenforcementoftheanti-briberyconvention.htm; for the 
challenges of its enforcement, see http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/strengthening_enforcement_of_the_oecd_ anti_bribery_convention 
(both last accessed 12 February 2016).
21 For the convention, and details on its implementation and monitoring, see https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/
22 See also http://m.myjoyonline.com/marticles/business/new-extractive-industries-transparency-initiative-requirement-will-ghana-comply (last accessed  
12 February 2016).
Box 10: Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems
Under the guidance of the CFS, these 10 principles were adopted in October 2014 after an inclusive consultation 
and intergovernmental negotiation period. They address three areas: human rights and social protection, natural 
resources and good governance. Principle 9 calls to ‘Incorporate inclusive and transparent governance structures, 
processes, and grievance mechanisms’, specifying that ‘Responsible investment in agriculture and food systems 
should abide by national legislation and public policies, and incorporate inclusive and transparent governance 
structures, processes, decision-making, and grievance mechanisms, accessible to all, through: i) Respecting the rule 
and application of law, free of corruption’ (CFS, 2014: 10 [para 29]).* 
Note: *For a critical assessment of the Principles, see http://www.benelexblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2015/05/21/principles-on-responsible-invest-
ment-in-agriculture-and-food-systems-a-very-critical-analysis/ (last accessed 12 February 2016).
5.3.2 Enforcement of anti-corruption legislation in 
agribusiness
Very little enforcement activity could be found in the 
agribusiness and land sector by the US, the UK and other 
OECD member countries that is directed at the upstream 
investor and corporate interests over which they have 
jurisdiction. If significant corruption can be laid at the 
feet of upstream actors in large land deals, the lack of 
publicly disclosed investigations and enforcement actions 
is surprising. While transnational land deals may be 
intricate and tracking the activities of all of the players 
difficult, the end result, the transfer and occupation of 
large tracts of land, is more tangible and visible than 
many kinds of projects in other sectors. This makes the 
appearance of corruption more pronounced. Any near-term 
adverse effects on local populations may spur protest, 
whistleblowing and calls for inquiry, more so than in cases 
where the harm is not so obvious or is attenuated.
Furthermore, there is every reason to believe US, UK 
and OECD governments charged with enforcing anti-
bribery and corporate accountability laws would treat 
well-founded allegations of corruption in large land deals 
the same as claims of illicit payments to foreign officials 
for concessions in the sale or purchase of other products 
and services.  While it is true that limited investigative and 
enforcement resources may be directed to certain problem 
areas, a review of recent actions suggests enforcement 
activities are comprehensive where the offence is serious 
and the case sound. Legislative measures, too, can target 
egregious harms, as with the disclosure and due diligence 
requirements for conflict minerals of the 2010 Dodd-Frank 
Act. There is no indication that this or other initiatives have 
diverted resources from land corruption investigations. 
Nor is there cause to address corruption in transnational 
agribusiness deals by special legislative or other means on 
the part of the financial centres, as these transactions are 
relatively few in the scheme of things and apparently are no 
more susceptible to corruption than other kinds.
5.4. Conclusions
Political economy analysis of land governance and 
administration at national level shows the importance of 
incentives of actors in driving corruption, especially in a 
context of weak formal institutions. Manipulation and use 
of multiple norms for land allocation and management 
to accumulate wealth and power appears to be of great 
significance for land governance as a whole. This is one 
key reason institutional reforms addressing corruption 
have not had more success. In particular, informal social 
and institutional practices and legal inconsistencies in land 
administration and investment planning can easily override 
the principles of land law and public service delivery. 
However, there is incremental evidence that stronger, more 
coherently organised and formally recognised institutions 
at a local and national level, coupled with new knowledge 
networks, can empower citizens to fight against corruption 
affecting their access to and control over land.  
On an international level, a number of both soft and 
hard laws to increase transparency and combat corruption 
are emerging, though these have not yet shown great 
effect in improving the transparency and accountability of 
large-scale land acquisitions. At a transnational level, this 
has to do with limited enforcement levels across sectors. 
More specifically, however, for agribusiness this may owe 
in part to the speed at which the ‘land rush’ took place, at 
a time when many host countries had in place neither the 
appropriate investment policy nor further accountability 
mechanisms. Such investments were frequently used as 
shortcuts to lucrative income and profits by national elites 
as well as local officials and leaders. The incentives of 
agribusiness are profit-based, and the mixture of expecting 
large profit margins and an incoherent regulatory and 
institutional framework to guide investments is highly 
corruption-prone. At the same time, the risks of ‘being 
caught’ are very low, as those who profit will not disclose 
the corrupt activity and those who lose out do not have the 
means or power to combat it (see also Box 8). 
These interrelationships between specific institutions 
and practices of land governance and drivers of corruption 
need to be disaggregated and assessed in more detail, 
generally and in any specific country case, to usefully 
inform policies and programming. We believe, however, 
much can be done to reduce risks of corruption in land 
governance surrounding agricultural investments by 
establishing much more direct linkages within home 
country government policies and in donor programming, 
between support for economic development (in 
agriculture and other sectors) and credit subsidies for 
private investment, on the one hand, and stronger tenure 
security and better land administration on the other. 
This is particularly the case in corruption-prone states, 
agricultural development corridors and rapidly expanding 
cities that are subjects of investment. It is also the case at 
global and regional levels, in analysing the land governance 
implications of sector policies and in lending and extending 
dialogue across home and recipient governments, with the 
private sector, land professional organisations and civil 
society, on strengthening transparency and accountability 
in land and related sectors. 
This conclusion is supported by recent work 
commissioned by the Global Donor Working Group on 
Land, which examined how governments can better align 
support to land governance with other development, 
commercial and policy objectives for public procurement, 
trade, finance, minerals development and environment 
(Wehrmann, 2015). Although this work did not focus 
specifically on corruption, many of the recommendations 
are relevant in tackling it and reducing its risks, and are 
directly in line with our own. These include mandatory 
regulations on land governance for official development 
assistance; linking land governance support to compliance 
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of home-based investors and other actors; developing 
national action plans on business and human rights 
and joint strategies with the private sector; promoting 
stronger corporate reporting; implementing international 
agreements and regulatory arrangements; and developing 
stronger safeguards, grievance mechanisms and 
ombudsmanship mechanisms. 
Our own recommendations for stakeholders to address 
corruption in land are in line with these conclusions and our 
recommendations, set out in Section 6. They concern action 
that can be pursued both jointly and separately by the main 
stakeholder groups, and for donor policy and programming. 
The latter include action against corruption generally within 
developing countries and emerging markets, and action 
targeted specifically at national land governance systems 
and land investment processes. Annex 6 presents a more 
detailed typology and overview of areas of land governance, 
corruption risks and potential mitigation strategies.
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6. Recommendations
6.1. National governments 
Here, we set out desirable measures for national 
governments to address corruption in land administration 
and the management of investment. These could be 
packaged and tailored in individual country contexts to 
inform strategic approaches, enabling governments to take 
relevant action that civil society, private sector, donors and 
multilateral agencies can support.
6.1.1 General actions
1. Implement UNCAC to strengthen horizontal and 
vertical accountability mechanisms and legislative 
anti-corruption framework across all sectors.
2. Introduce effective asset and income declaration systems 
for officials, including specification of the valuation and 
verification of landholdings process by officials. 
3. Hold training for anti-corruption agencies in screening 
and following up on reports of corruption. 
6.1.2 Land-specific actions
1. Support and implement legal reforms to ensure 
recognition of multiple forms of tenure, including 
customary rights, to promote more inclusive 
formalisation of rights and delivery of land services 
and mitigate corruption in the allocation, conversion 
and development of customary land.
2. Prioritise and implement land administration reform, 
supported by analysis and mitigation of procedural 
weaknesses, corruption risks and vulnerability to elite 
capture.
3. Introduce preventive measures to limit the discretional 
power of central and local government administrations 
with regard to land transfers and allocations, prioritising 
a) completeness and transparency of the cadastre and 
b) community participation and accountability.
4. Prioritise the support of legal reforms to ensure 
recognition of multiple forms of tenure including 
customary rights, to promote more inclusive 
formalisation of rights and delivery of land services 
and to mitigate corruption in the allocation, 
conversion and development of customary land.
5. Respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) in relation to changes in the established land 
rights of indigenous peoples, or at the minimum, and in 
all cases, free, prior and informed consultation, to ensure 
clear principles guiding transparency and disclosure at 
a community level in any transactions involving large-
scale land deals and expropriations, including where 
expropriation may be justified for public purpose.
6. Strengthen training in land administration on 
governance and transparency dimensions, with an 
emphasis on public service, fairness and probity, 
including knowledge of national and international 
best practice (VGGT and the CFS RAI).
7. Introduce a more performance-oriented culture and 
system of remuneration into land administration to 
provide alternative incentives to rent-seeking based on 
users’ willingness to pay for services and transactions; 
also introduce institutional and individual 
responsibilities and requirements for compensation in 
the event of mistakes, such as inaccurate, overlapping 
or multiple land allocations.
8. Introduce public disclosure of governmental approval 
process for agribusiness land transactions.
9. Introduce appropriate ICT-based approaches 
to increase transparency and accountability, 
including independent, secure, credible and effective 
whistleblowing hotlines.
10. Support helplines, complaints and grievance 
mechanisms, such as ombudspersons and legal advice 
centres.
11. Strengthen the monitoring of progress of land 
administration, including corruption indicators.
12. Support legal empowerment programmes at 
community level, as an essential complement to work 
within the land administration system, including the 
capacity for monitoring and reporting. 
13. Support processes and institutions integrating 
community leaders and communities into transparent 
land management systems at a local level.
In addition, there are actions parliamentarians and 
civil society can take at national level to promote the 
application of these measures (see Sections 6.3 and 6.5).
6.2. Private sector
Here, we set out desirable actions the private sector and 
specifically agribusiness investors can take. In addition, 
private sector stakeholders supporting the development 
and delivery of good systems of land administration can 
take various actions to combat corruption (see Section 6.6). 
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6.2.1 General actions
1. Demonstrate clear leadership on a zero tolerance to 
corruption.
2. Implement best practice and mainstream 
encompassing corporate anti-corruption policies at all 
operational levels throughout the investment chain. 
These should include clear follow-up mechanisms and 
be supported by process improvement initiatives to 
address corruption. 
3. Ensure compliance with national and international 
anti-corruption legislation, including commitment to 
long-term institutional change in countries with weak 
governance, for instance by actively engaging with 
chambers of commerce. 
4. Set up an internal, secure whistleblowing mechanism 
that enjoys commitment at CEO level, falls under 
the responsibility of senior management, is clearly 
communicated throughout the company and provides 
safeguards against retaliation.
6.2.2 Land-specific actions
1. Participate in voluntary reporting of land rights 
footprints and impacts of agri-investments and supply 
chains in conformity with UN Global Compact 
principles, utilising Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
reporting mechanisms and relevant GRI standards 
and indicators on land tenure currently under 
development.
2. Develop clear rules and standards of engagement at 
national and local level for large-scale international 
agricultural investment, guided by the VGGT and 
the CFS RAI, where appropriate engaging with peers 
to develop international implementation guidelines; 
with host governments to develop clear standards of 
engagement informed by the VGGT; and with civil 
society and communities to develop clear standards of 
consent, guided by FPIC, to reduce the scope and risk 
of corruption. 
3. Mainstream environment, social and governance 
assessments and follow-up procedures throughout the 
investment chain. 
4. Ensure internal whistleblowing mechanisms against 
corruption are specifically applied by on-the-ground 
company operators to land rights and governance 
questions, and such mechanisms are available to 
members of affected communities and local land users. 
5. Develop monitoring tools for corruption throughout 
an investment lifecycle.
6. Improve reporting on land corruption among 
associates, peers and supply chain actors, utilising 
mechanisms such as commodity roundtables and in-
country business associations.
6.3. Investor countries 
6.3.1 General actions by governments 
1. Ensure the establishment of coherent and up-to-
date whole-of-government approaches to addressing 
corruption, including land corruption in foreign 
jurisdictions.
2. Strengthen and support the enforcement of the 
OECD Convention both in OECD countries, by 
implementing and enforcing anti-bribery legislation, 
and in non-OECD countries, by continuing to support 
engagement with China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand.
3. Support legislative measures that address 
transnational corruption (e.g. the UK Bribery Act, the 
FCPA). 
4. Support strong anti-money laundering (AML) laws in 
the financial centres, such as the US Bank Secrecy Act 
or Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidelines, that 
call for enhanced monitoring by the global financial 
system when conducting business with PEPs. 
6.3.2 Land-specific actions by governments
1. Continue to promote and build coalitions to 
implement the VGGT and CFS RAI.
2. Introduce government requirements for the disclosure 
of large-scale agricultural investments originating 
in investor countries and promoted by official aid, 
guided by the VGGT and the CFS RAI.
3. Condition financial participation in large-scale 
agricultural investments on implementation of anti-
corruption measures, including financial reporting.
6.3.3 Actions at parliamentary level 
In addition, national parliaments and parliamentarians 
can take actions to support coherent whole-of-government 
approaches to address corruption in land. It should be 
noted that these recommendations also apply to parliaments 
of countries hosting land-based investments and countries 
suffering routine corruption in land governance.
1. Engage more actively in holding governments to 
account in the implementation and enforcement of 
anti-bribery legislation. 
2. Propose and debate measures to ensure transparency 
of large-scale agricultural investments and 
strengthen land governance process recognition and 
documentation of all existing land rights surrounding 
large-scale investments. 
3. Propose measures for implementing the VGGT 
and monitoring adherence of different sectors of 
government to the guidelines in practice. 
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6.4. Donors and multilateral agencies
Here we set out recommendations donor agencies 
can take. These form critical elements of whole-of-
government approaches by investor countries to address 
land corruption in developing countries, and specifically 
to ensure donor programming and action designed to 
promote land investment and encourage private sector 
growth does not also inadvertently promote or enable 
corruption in land.
1. Provide financial and technical support to partner 
countries to strengthen the implementation of anti-
corruption and land governance reforms listed under 
Section 6.1, prioritising support for legal reforms 
to ensure recognition of multiple forms of tenure, 
including customary rights, to promote more inclusive 
formalisation of rights and delivery of land services 
and mitigate corruption in the allocation, conversion 
and development of customary land.
2. Introduce mandatory corruption risk assessments and 
mitigation measures that are sensitive to elite capture 
in all land administration and land titling support 
programmes.
3. Introduce land governance support and related 
anti-corruption measures into areas prioritised 
for agricultural development and land investment, 
and link land governance support directly to other 
projects that tend to promote corruption in land 
administration to mitigate negative impacts. This 
includes: 
 a. Make disclosure of land areas targeted for 
investment and land rights and land concessions 
acquired by private companies and the relevant 
investment contracts mandatory for all projects 
implemented or provided with credit subsidy under 
official development assistance. .  
 b. Give grants to partnership initiatives between 
the private sector, government and civil society, 
possibly linked to agricultural development and 
investment subsidy programmes to enable countries 
to document, visualise and communicate publically 
the land rights and land use context; countries to 
support and undertake land rights assessments and 
proper stakeholder consultation; and local/regional/
national government to strengthen land information 
systems and public accountability through stakeholder 
roundtables. .  
 c. Specifically, DFID and like-minded donors 
consider tying a land governance advisory and 
support facility directly to investment support 
and subsidy programmes, so companies/countries/
stakeholders involved can get dedicated advice and 
assistance.
4. Exercise caution in programming any support for 
agricultural and infrastructure investment or for 
land titling and registration programmes in weak 
and corruption-prone land governance environments 
(requiring prior political economy assessment to 
identify risks of elite capture, as well as concentration 
in the short term on relevant legal and institutional 
reforms and support to civil society to promote 
accountability and legal empowerment).
5. Support the Global Donor Working Group on Land 
to engage with home governments towards full VGGT 
implementation, including extraterritorial investments, 
including engagement on international rules, open 
contracts and policy coherence in striving for whole-
of-government approaches at home and abroad.
6. Place the highest priority on renewing efforts around 
land transparency by linking a G7 and corporate 
land transparency and reporting initiative to existing 
corporate reporting mechanisms, for example through 
extension of the EITI to land and by utilising GRI 
sustainability reporting, which is due to incorporate 
land.
7. Consider introducing mandatory land governance 
components in infrastructure and agribusiness 
investments that carry land corruption risks.
8. Increase support for local accountability mechanisms 
and legal empowerment both around land titling and 
registration support programmes and in relation to 
large-scale agricultural projects. 
9. Support the development of methodologies for 
data generation and country-level context-specific 
and comparative analysis of land governance and 
corruption. 
10. Specifically, seek to strengthen the analytics for land-
related corruption in the LGAF and other land-related 
assessment and analytical tools. 
11. Support further research on the relationship between 
corruption in land, investment, economic growth and 
development and the roles income and inequality play.
12. Generally, use the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), in particular Goal 16, as a frame of reference 
to mainstream anti-corruption programming in land 
governance, and operationalise them in conjunction 
with sector-specific frameworks such as the VGGT 
and the CFS RAI.
6.5. Civil society
Here, we set out recommendations for civil society at national 
level in developing and investment-host countries and for 
supporting actions civil society can take internationally.
6.5.1 National civil society actions: 
1. Conduct systematic raining and advocacy for citizens, 
local NGOs and grassroots organisations on how 
to activate pressure points, in particular increased 
understanding of existing legal framework; scope, 
content and stakeholders of international best 
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practices, in particular the VGGT; and commitments 
of the government at national and international level 
to achieve greater transparency and accountability. 
2. Run public awareness campaigns on how to identify 
potential corruption, conflicts of interest and vehicles 
for reporting.
3. Set up and run own reporting hotlines, guided by the 
Do No Harm principle, to increase transparency on 
corrupt practices in land administration. 
4. Collaborate with regional and international civil 
society organisations to lobby for and monitor 
implementation of the VGGT. 
6.5.2 International civil society actions
1. Collaborate with national civil society organisations 
to foster knowledge exchange on international best 
practice on land governance and anti-corruption, in 
particular on the VGGT. 
2. Sensitise citizens in the North and South on the 
causes and effects of corruption in land governance, 
in particular in large-scale agricultural investments, 
and support constructive processes of addressing these 
problems, using the VGGT and the CFS RAI as a 
frame of reference. 
3. Support and engage in multi-stakeholder processes 
between the private sector, the public sector (in 
the North and South) and civil society to support 
transparency in transnational large-scale agricultural 
investment projects.
4. Support international media coverage of corrupt deals 
to foster national and international accountability 
processes. 
5. Sensitise governments and citizens in the North and 
South on the linkages of addressing corruption in land 
governance with the SDGs, in particular Goal 16 and 
its sub-goals. 
6.6. Media, technology and mapping 
initiatives across sectors
Finally, as noted under the recommendations for the private 
sector (Section 6.2), we summarise actions that can be 
taken specifically by the digital open data community as a 
whole, including for profit developers and technology firms, 
non-profit social enterprise and civil society organisations 
and private and public investors and funding organisations.
1. Foster enhanced use of media, social media and Open 
Source Intelligence Tools (OSINT) to support the 
distribution and gathering of information about land 
deals and increasing public involvement at all stages 
of the transactions. 
2. Support mapping initiatives such as Google Earth, the 
Land Matrix Database and others that can harvest 
corruption-sensitive data on land deals to be made 
public and to be input into systems and applications. 
3. Support innovative uses of technology like mobile 
money that can bypass lower-level officials, reducing 
the opportunity for bribery. Other processes, such as 
applications for and issuance of land documents or 
putting property records online, may be automated 
using online/mobile hardware and software. 
4. Introduce social media platforms to disseminate 
more positive examples of successful anti-corruption 
interventions and actions. 
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Annex 1: East African Bribery Index 2012–2014
Data generated from East African Bribery Index shows that bribery in dealing with Land Services consistently features 
within the top ten ranks, with a slightly increasing trend. 
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Table 3: East African Bribery Index 2012-2014
# 2012 Country 2013 Country 2014 Country
1 Police Uganda Police Tanzania Police Uganda
2 Police Tanzania Police Kenya Police Tanzania
3 Police Kenya Police Burundi Police Burundi
4 Land services Kenya Police Uganda Police Kenya
5 Judiciary Burundi Police Rwanda Land services Uganda
6 Police Burundi Others Rwanda Land services Kenya
7 Judiciary Tanzania Land services Burundi Judiciary Kenya
8 Judiciary Uganda Judiciary Burundi Police Rwanda
9 Police Rwanda Land services Kenya Land services Burundi
10 Land services Burundi Land services Uganda Judiciary Tanzania
Source: Authors, based on TI Kenya (2015). 
Annex 2: Corruption and the LGAF scorecards
Klaus Deininger and his fellow authors present key findings 
of LGAF results. They do not focus on corruption, but on 
the correlation between land governance and agricultural 
performance (Deininger et al., 2014). Their findings are highly 
interesting, displaying validated rankings for each indicator 
in 10 African countries and three non-African countries (to 
provide a broader, cross-regional perspective). The tables 
show there are pertinent differences between individual 
countries, corroborating the premise that history, institutional 
framework and political economy of each country matters. 
But the tables also flag evident corruption risks. The following 
tables pertain to the LGAF scoring for recognition and respect 
for existing land rights (Table 4) and to the LGAF scoring for 
public provision of land information (Table 5). 
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Table 5: LGAF scoring for public provision of land information, 10 African and 3 non-African countries
Source: Deininger et al. (2014:83)
Table 4: LGAF scoring for recognition and for existing rights, 10 African and 3 non-African countries
Source: Deininger et al. (2014:81)
Annex 3: Explanatory notes on the text analysis 
methodology
Although the methodology of the LGAF country reports 
has evolved and been modified over time, affecting their 
comparability, they provide the most comprehensive 
assessments on land governance that have been conducted 
across so many countries. The LGAF country reports 
provide a wealth of qualitative data on perceptions and 
practices of corruption in land governance. 
In this paper, we have sought to probe how useful the 
data are to profile practices and patterns of corruption in 
specific land governance areas. The content analysis is to be 
understood as an exploratory undertaking within the resource 
constraints of this mandate. Its prime objective is to explore the 
potential analytical significance of the LGAF country reports, 
illuminating avenues of future, more thorough, analyses 
for future research. It does not claim to be comprehensive, 
rigorously systematic or significant in its findings. 
Content analysis consists mainly of breaking down text 
into pertinent units of information for their subsequent 
categorisation and interpretation. The structure of the 
LGAF reports provides one matrix of analysis, denoting 
thematic areas across the country reports (note the 
disclaimer regarding the modified methodology of the 
reports). However, for the purposes of this analysis, the 
missing unit of information is the category ‘corruption’. 
To harvest this information and make it fruitful for 
subsequent analysis following steps were undertaken.
1. Definitions of key terms
Understanding the LGAF reports are written by different 
authors in different contexts with possible linguistic 
differences, key terms were chosen very broadly to 
capture as wide a spectrum as possible. The search terms 
below denote or imply corruption and corruption risks 
as frequently used in land governance in a first cursory 
reading of the reports. This list was enhanced with key 
terms stemming from anti-corruption discourse. The 
terms were modified for each report to accommodate 
potential synonymous terms (i.e. not transparent instead of 
transparency) and outlier terms (i.e. nepotism, informal staff 
loans, discretionary payment, etc.):
 • corrupt/corruption/anti-corruption
 • land grab
 • bribe/bribing 
 • fraud/fraudulent
 • rent-seeking/rent-seekers
 • laundering
 • informal fees/informal payments/informal institutions
 • illegal staff behaviour
 • misconduct
 • compliance/non- compliance
 • transparency
 • power
 • authority
 • abuse
 • exploitation
 • deals (self-interested deals)
 • expropriation
 • collusion
 • personal gain
This key term search was conducted in all English full 
or country reports in Africa. 
2. Frequency and context of key terms
Once relevant keywords were located, total hits per 
term were tracked and we pinpointed their locations 
according to page number, section and subsection(s). The 
hits found that were particularly substantive within the 
scope of corruption in the land governance sector were 
contextualised even further by quoting the context in 
which they appeared.
3. Visualisation
For the sole purposes of illustrating potential uses of the 
analysis, one of many possible correlations was selected 
for translation into a graph. To construct the graph 
visually linking frequency, type and area of corruption, 
data were compiled from selected full country or final 
country reports of Sub-Saharan countries (Gambia, Ghana, 
Malawi, Nigeria). The information presented in the graphs 
reflects the number of hits for some of the selected terms 
and their corresponding section/subsection. Owing to 
formatting restrictions, include index tables beneath each 
of the graphs were as a key for interpreting the section/
subsection values. The tables are designed to reflect only 
the illustrations of the graphs and not the total findings for 
the four countries (see Annex 4).
4. Interpretation
Given the exploratory nature of the analysis, interpretation 
at this stage can be only highly tentative. Preliminary 
findings indicate that, although the same types of 
corruption can be found across countries, their causes 
and the areas in which they occur differ widely between 
countries. Findings also show corruption is usually seen in 
conjunction with wider governance weaknesses. 
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Methodological disclaimer:
The methodology requires substantial modification to 
capture specific meanings and correlations of the individual 
terms more robustly. For instance, the term ‘transparency’ 
can potentially be used to describe effective and positive 
procedures, thus not denoting a corruption risk. Here, the 
contexts within which each term is used provide valuable 
clues to further coding and categorisation of terms, which 
could not be taken further in this paper. 
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Annex 4: Visualisation of tentative findings from 
text analysis of selected LGAF country reports
The visualisations seek to relate the frequency with which key terms denoting corruption and corruption risks were 
mentioned and to link them to the thematic areas and subsections of the report in which they appeared. Although 
the methodology is far from mature, the visualisations illuminate the potential for utilising the LGAF country reports 
to contextualise types and patterns of corruption in land governance within and across countries. Methodological 
disclaimers can be found in Annex 3. 
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Source: Authors (drawing on LGAF country reports).
Annex 5: Corruption risks in international business
An international survey by Control Risk on business attitudes to corruption sheds light on the corporate perspectives on 
bribery. Tables 6–10 show some key corporate challenges:
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Table 9: Facilitation payments are essential to keep our 
business going – by location of respondent
Table 6: Three most challenging internal anti-corruption 
and compliance issues
Source: Control risk (2015, 31).
Table 7: Three most challenging external anti-corruption 
and compliance issues
Source: Control risk (2015, 32).
Table 8: Impact of refusal to pay facilitation payments – 
global responses
Source: Control risk (2015, 37).
Source: Control risk (2015, 37).
Table 10: Facilitation payments are essential to keep our business going – by sector
Source: Control risk (2015, 38).
Title 51 
Annex 6: Risks, forms and drivers of corruption in 
land governance
This table seeks to pinpoint areas, risks factors and forms of corruption and to link them with political economy drivers 
and potential mitigation strategies. It is based on a table developed by TI and FAO (2011, 7), which is further developed 
by incorporating additional dimensions (political economy drivers and potential mitigation strategies) as well as some 
further areas and risk factors emerging from the findings in this report.
Table 11: Risks, forms and drivers of corruption in land governance
Area Risk factors Forms Political economy drivers Potential mitigation strategies
Land 
administration 
- Inadequate land laws and 
procedures 
- Excessive or unpublished 
fees for land services
- Lack of recognition of land 
uses and rights
- Underdeveloped and non-
transparent land registration 
systems 
- Absence of up-to-date and 
accurate land records
- Existence of multiple land 
management authorities
- Monopolisation of services, 
e.g. surveying by public 
officials
- Irregular practices in the 
collection of land taxes
- Limited accessibility of 
services
- Lack of effective compliant, 
grievance and oversight 
mechanisms
- Absence of a code of conduct
- Willingness to pay of 
better-off users to access land 
services 
- Bribery of and rent-seeking by land 
administration officials in provision 
of land information, services and 
documentation
-Bribery of judicial authorities
- Favouritism and nepotism by 
land in decision-making by land 
administration officials
- Elite capture and preferential access 
to land titling schemes
- Manipulation and interference 
of land records, land adjudication 
and dispute resolution in favour of 
influential people and investors
- Manipulation of land valuation to 
secure higher prices and/or reduce 
compensation payable
- Fraud and production of false land 
claim documentation, certificates 
and titles
- Embezzlement of public finance for 
land administration and land revenues 
by public officials and politicians 
- Use of public institutions as a 
platform for private practice (e.g. by 
surveyors and planners) 
- Manipulation in public procurement 
of land administration services by 
officials and politicians to win private 
contracts
- Historical bias of land 
administration systems and 
formally recognised tenure 
systems towards the better-off and 
business and urban users
- Maintenance of colonial 
principles and practice in design 
and management of post-colonial 
institutions
- Under-resourcing of land 
administration in developing 
countries
- Social and economic inequality 
and exclusion; illiteracy and 
asymmetric access to information
- Vested interests of politicians, 
land officials and land 
professionals in the maintenance 
of discretionary authority opaque 
systems, and traditional manual 
technologies
- Design of fit-for-purpose land 
administration systems for land 
registration, tenure regularisation 
and titling; rationalisation and 
integration of multiple land 
authorities
- Prioritisation of the land sector 
in public service reform and 
anti-corruption campaigns
- Development of new appropriate 
standards for land administration 
and performance-based incentives 
- Computerisation of land records 
with electronic checks and 
balances and fail-safes in land 
records, land valuation and land 
revenue management (e.g. block 
chain technologies or open and 
crowdsourced land data)
- Training of new generations of 
land professionals 
- Public information and legal 
empowerment
- Wider action to combat social 
and economic inequalities
- Grievance and complaint 
procedures; legal remedies for 
poor performance 
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Customary land 
tenure 
- Lack of legal recognition and 
delineation of customary land; 
-Traditional practices of 
payments and ritual/ symbolic 
exchanges 
-Entrenchment of power over 
land in the hands of traditional 
leaders as a result of colonial 
policies and post-colonial 
settlements
- Opaque systems, absence of 
outside control and lack of clarity 
in allocation of land
- Commodification of customary 
land and speculation on land 
sales
- Land administration 
and planning procedures 
inappropriate to full range of 
tenure types 
- Official bias against land 
service delivery to the poor and 
in customary areas  
- Rural–urban migration and 
population growth increasing 
demand for urban residential 
land
- Abuse of power by chiefs 
- Accumulation of control over land 
revenues by chiefs and influential 
people
- Multiple allocations of the same 
plots customary authorities land
- Conversion of customary and rural 
land for urban development as a 
means of revenue generation: rent-
seeking by officials as gatekeepers 
for conversion and exploitation 
of price premia and differentials 
between customary/titled land 
in land disposals by chiefs and 
influential people
- Reluctance of officials to provide 
land services to the customary 
sector, owing to limited willingness 
to pay 
- National institutions and business 
interests override local land rights
- Place of rural elites, customary 
authorities and land owning families 
in post-colonial constitutional and 
political settlements
- Inadequate incorporation an 
failures of integration of customary 
principles and values within modern 
state institutions; vested interest of 
customary authorities in politics and 
business
- Rising land values in peri-urban 
and high value agricultural areas 
under customary control
- Land as one of the only sources of 
accumulation available to households 
and business people in rural areas
- Interests of national institutions 
and business people override those 
of customary landholders and users 
in national legislation
- Asymmetries/ inequalities in 
access to information, legal 
awareness, resources and social 
influence between officials/ 
traditional leaders/ business people 
and customary land users 
- Legal reform for recognition of 
customary forms of tenure
- Legal instruments applicable 
to customary land, e.g. 
leasehold contract instruments, 
revenue-sharing agreements; 
legal incorporation of community 
groups  
- Service standards for land 
administration and land use 
planning arrangements in 
customary areas
- Training and accountability 
mechanisms for customary 
authorities and community 
leaders
- Legal awareness and 
empowerment of community 
groups for land management 
- Training of paralegals and land 
para-professionals at community 
level  
Management 
of state-owned 
land 
- Lack of inventory, delineation 
and management of state land
- Irregularity of land prices for 
disposal and acquisition 
- Unclear institutional 
responsibilities and decision 
mechanisms
- Absence or lack of clarity of 
regulations for leasing land or 
exercising eminent domain
- Lack of effective compliant, 
grievance and oversight 
mechanisms
- Collusion with and bribery of 
government officials by private 
interests to obtain public land at a 
fraction of market value
- Manipulation of compulsory land 
acquisition and compensation 
processes by government officials 
and investors 
- Inadequate legal framework for 
conversion of customary to public to 
private land
- Irregular conversion of property 
and land classification status by 
government officials
- Doctrine of eminent domain/
absolute authority over land vested 
in state/president
- Centralisation of authority over 
public land
- Discretionary authority of public 
officials over land at multiple levels
Much of the above applies, as 
adapted to urban development 
contexts
- Development and disclosure of 
proper inventories and mapping 
of public and state-owned land 
- Constitutional restrictions on 
the exercise of eminent domain 
by the state vis-à-vis established 
public, private and customary 
interests in land
- Decentralisation of state powers 
over land, e.g. removing direct 
presidential nomination control of 
commissioners for land
Land use 
planning, 
conversion and 
investments 
- Lack of transparency of planning 
processes and land allocation 
procedures 
- Opaque, slow and bureaucratic 
processes for issuing building 
development permits 
- Unclear land use and property 
rights
- Lack of effective frameworks 
and capacity for land use planning
- Lack of mechanisms for 
participation and accountability in 
land use planning  
- Lack of effective complaint, 
grievance, independent oversight 
and enforcement mechanisms 
- Lack of an independent media 
- Capture of rents and profits 
originating from land conversion 
and re-zoning by government 
officials and investors
- Abuse of government officials’ 
discretionary power to propose real 
estate and land developments that 
increase the value of their personal 
property
- Acquisition of land through state 
capture and/or by investors and 
developers having received insider 
information from government 
officials 
- Bribery of government officials by 
investors and/or developers 
- Absence of investment in land 
use planning capacity
- Vested interests of national elites 
in urban development projects
- Vested interest of rural 
community leaders in land 
development
(Much of the above applies, as 
adapted to urban development 
contexts)
- Development of appropriate 
land use planning services
- Stakeholder and community-
based accountability 
mechanisms for land use 
planning 
Table 11: Risks, forms and drivers of corruption in land governance (cont’d)
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Area Risk factors Forms Political economy drivers Potential mitigation strategies
Large-
scale land 
acquisition/ 
disposal for 
investment 
purposes
- Inadequate legal and policy 
frameworks for screening, 
management and monitoring 
of investment projects
- Lack of coordination 
between investment agencies 
and land administration 
authorities
- Centralisation of powers 
over investment projects and 
large-scale land allocations
- Absent or incomplete land 
records in areas targeted for 
investment
- Failure to incorporate 
principles of FPIC in national 
legislation and policy
- Lack of disclosure and 
transparency in relation to 
investment projects 
- Vested interests of politicians 
and officials in land investment 
projects
- Bribery and manipulation of 
community leaders
- Payments of bribes and kickbacks 
to officials involved in approving 
land allocations
- Circumvention of agreed and 
legally binding consultation 
procedures
- Political interference in land 
acquisition and allocation
- Influence of global international 
business interests over national 
development policies
- Encouragement and promotion 
of private sector investment in 
development policy 
- Vested interests of politicians in 
investment projects 
- Lack of accountability and 
responsiveness towards citizens
- Inadequate policy and regulatory 
framework for large-scale 
agricultural investments in host 
countries
- International investment 
contract law
- Enforcement of international 
law
- Compliance with international 
best practices (VGGT)
- Disclosure of investment plans 
and practice by companies and 
donor countries 
- Enforcement of relevant 
national laws (e.g. on 
community consultation and 
consent) 
- Better coordination between 
relevant authorities
- Accountability and 
transparency mechanisms
- Incorporate measures 
to ensure disclosure and 
transparency and support 
to land governance in donor 
programmes for investment 
support and credit subsidies 
especially in corruption-
vulnerable frontier markets
Table 11: Risks, forms and drivers of corruption in land governance (cont’d)
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